期刊文献+

上市公司股权结构对公司治理的影响 被引量:4

The Influence of Ownership Structure on the Management of Public Company
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摘要 股票市场的投资者大致可以分为三类:散户、大户(控股股东)和机构投资者。这些投资者也构成了上市公司的股权结构。由于不同类型投资者的特征不同,直接影响了上市公司的治理方式。散户投资者通常资金规模较小,一般进行被动投资,不直接参与上市公司治理。上市公司治理主要依靠法律法规体系,股票市场交易机制。以散户股东为主构成的上市公司的治理模式形成了“保持距离型”公司治理模式,其特点是没有大股东侵占公司利益,但容易造成“内部人控制”。大户投资者所拥有的资金规模较大,且是自有资金,所以没有资金的代理成本,他们在上市公司中通常拥有一定的控股地位。存在大户投资者股东的上市公司,由于大户投资者会对经理人进行有效的监管,不容易有“内部人控制”现象,但大股东为追求“私有利益”,往往有着对小股东的侵权行为。机构投资者虽然也拥有资金规模大的特点,但其资金是有代理成本的,另外受政策法规的限制,传统上机构投资者也不直接参与公司治理,只进行被动投资。但自20世纪90年代以来,受机构投资者持股比例不断上升及维持投资者风格等原因的影响,机构投资者开始逐渐直接参与公司治理,其方法主要是积极主义投资,如投票动议和与上市公司经理人谈判等。 The investors in the stock market can be divided into small investors, big investors (block shareholder) and institutional investors, which consist of the ownership structure of public companies. The different characteristics of investors make direct effects on the corporate management. As small investors hold small scale of capital, generally they do not take active invest and make direct effects on the corporate management. The management of the public companies of which the ownership structure consists of mainly small investors is the pattern of “arm’ s length”, relying on the law system and the trade mechanism of the stock market basically, with no private benefits of control but large managerial entrenchment probability. The big investors hold control stake in the company with their large-scale capital pay no agency cost. The corporate management with big investors generally takes the pattern of “control-oriented”, with small large managerial entrenchment probability but high private benefits of control possibility. As institutional investors hold large-scale capital with agency cost and some restriction of the law system, traditionally they only take passive invest and do not make direct effects on corporate management. With the reasons such as the growing proportion of the shares they hold and the investing characteristics they want to maintain, institutional investors begun to make direct effects on corporate management since 1990s with mail method of shareholder activism such as voting proxy and negotiation with managers of public companies, etc.
出处 《学术月刊》 CSSCI 北大核心 2005年第8期34-40,共7页 Academic Monthly
关键词 上市公司 股权结构 治理方式 治理模式 股票市场交易 代理成本 ownership structure, stock market, public company, corporate management
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