上市公司董事会与CEO关系治理理论述评被引量：6

The Governance Theories on the Relationship between Board and CEO of Listed Company A Review

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摘要在上市公司这个结构系统中,董事会与CEO是其中至关重要的两个要素,以何种理论为指导来治理两者之间的关系,对上市公司的最终业绩表现起着决定性作用。鉴于此,本文对国外治理上市公司董事会与CEO关系的代表性理论,即代理理论、管家理论和资源依赖理论三个治理理论,进行了一个简要述评,然后结合三种治理理论的各自特性及董事会与CEO关系的动态性和复杂性进行了总结。 Board of listed company and its CEO are two most important factors in the system of the listed company. What governing theories have been adopted decides the final performance of listed company. Therefore the paper reviews the related typical theories such as Agency Theory, Stewardship Theory and Resource-dependence Theory, and then summarizes the three governing theories combining their attributes with the dynamic and complex relationship between board and CEO of listed company.

作者杨林

机构地区南京大学商学院

出处《当代经济管理》 2005年第3期46-52,共7页 Contemporary Economic Management

关键词上市公司董事会与CEO关系代理理论管家理论资源依赖理论 the relation between board and CEO of listed company agency theory stewardship theory resource-dependence theory -Dependence theory

分类号 F830.91 [经济管理—金融学]

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