摘要
串谋现象造成了经济组织效率的低下和社会福利的损失,独立董事和管理层之间的串谋行为则严重影响了独立董事制度的有效运行,损害了中小股东利益。本文在国内外防范串谋理论研究成果的基础上,分析了我国独立董事和管理层之间串谋行为的产生是由于在我国公司治理结构中存在着串谋孳生的基本条件以及独立董事制度运行缺乏有效的激励与约束机制等原因,并提出了“胡萝卜”政策和“大棒”政策有效结合、内部监督与外部监督有效结合以及现金激励和股权激励有效结合等防范措施。
The phenomenon of collusion gives rise to decrease in efficiency of economic organization and loss of social welfare. The collusion behavior between independent directors and managers seriously affects availability of operating independent director system and does harm to interests of middle-small shareholders. Based on collusion-proof theory’s researches inside and outside of China, reasons for collusion such as collusion conditions’ existence in Chinese corporations’ governance structure and absence of effective incentive and commitment mechanism during exerting independent directors system are assayed, and suggestions such as combination of “carrot” policy with “rod” policy, internal supervision with external supervision and cash incentive with equity incentive for precaution are expounded as well.
出处
《西北农林科技大学学报（社会科学版）》
2005年第3期82-87,共6页
Journal of Northwest A&F University(Social Science Edition)
关键词
独立董事制度
串谋
防范串谋原理
等价原理
内、外部监督人
ndependent directors system
collusion
collusion-proof principle
equivalence principle
internal and external supervisor
