摘要
创业家和创业资本家都付出不可观察的努力来提高企业的效率, 创业企业面临双边道德风险。本文解释了创业企业融资合约中常见的可转换证券的融资安排。当创业家和创业资本家的联合努力有助于提高项目的收益时, 双方的努力程度与投资的数量相关。论文证明当投资者的投资比例低时, 她必须被赋予普通股, 而当其投资比例高时, 她获得可转换债券或优先股。此外, 通过比较三种创业投资市场结构下最优合约的特征, 本文表明在创业投资市场中, 垄断比竞争更能有效率地控制双向道德风险。
In a new venture, the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist plunge in a double moral hazard context where they both can exert unobservable efforts to enhance productivity. This paper provides a rationale for the frequently observed use of convertible securities in venture capital agreements. When the joint efforts of the entrepreneur and the venture capitalist contribute to improve the profitability of the project, the level of effort provided is related to the amount invested. It shows that when the venture capitalist’s investments is low, she must be given common stocks, while she obtains convertible bonds or preferred stocks when her investments is high. Moreover, comparing with the characteristics of the optimal contracts in different venture capital markets, this paper show that monopolized market is more efficient than competitive one to control double moral hazard in the new venture.
出处
《中央财经大学学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第4期39-43,共5页
Journal of Central University of Finance & Economics
关键词
创业企业
双边道德风险
可转换证券
融资合约
New venture Double moral hazard Convertible securities Financial contracts
