摘要
外资并购活动必然会对东道国市场的竞争行为和竞争格局产生重要影响,本文通过构建一个政府参与的外资并购的纳什—库诺特模型论证这些影响的机制及其后果。在模型中,把政府非对称性政策规制因素引入外资并购行为下的市场竞争框架中进行探讨。基本结论是:非对称性政府规制能够影响企业的市场竞争行为、调节企业的市场份额,并能够左右市场结构。
Foreign investors' merger and acquisition will inevitably produce important effects on competitive actions and competitive patterns of the host countries' markets. This paper demonstrates the mechanism and results of these effects by constructing a Nash-Cournot model, with government as a participator in foreign investors' merger and acquisition. In the model, the factors of asymmetric regulation are discussed in the market competition framework on the basis of foreign investors' merger and acquisition. The basic conclusion is that the asymmetric regulation can affect enterprises' market competition,adjust enterprises' market share and control market structure.
出处
《中国软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2005年第2期40-45,共6页
China Soft Science
关键词
外资并购
政府规制
市场竞争
纳什-库诺特模型
foreign investors' merger and acquisition (FIMA)
government regulation
market competition
Nash-Cournot model
