摘要
股份有限公司作为一个开放性的公司,不再是仅与几个股东利益相关的法人实体,而是与数以千计甚至万计的股东(投资者)息息相关,并肩负有一定的社会责任,股份有限公司的董事会及董事如何正确行使职权、对其"恶"如何抑制的问题显得日益突出。根据对董事"恶"之抑制机制的不同性质,可以分为对董事的内部抑制和外部抑制。内部抑制主要是通过公司章程对董事之"恶"进行制约,外部抑制则通过法律规定对董事之"恶"进行制约。
As an open company, a stock limited company is no longer a legal entity having interests with a few shareholders, it has closely related to hundreds and thousands of shareholders (investors) and undertakes some social liabilities. In this sense, how directors and the Board of Directors employ their powers, and how to confine their 'maliciousness' are increasingly significant. According to the different characteristics of the confining system, we can divide the systems into internal confining system and external confining system. The internal confining system confines directors' 'maliciousness' by the charter of corporations, and the external confining system does it by law.
出处
《政法论坛》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第5期50-58,共9页
Tribune of Political Science and Law
