摘要
银行信誉的重要性来自于信息不对称的存在,强制信息披露能提高稳健型银行的信誉,并且信息披露的程度越高,稳健型银行的信誉也越高,但其对冒险型银行信誉的影响是不确定的。
The importance of credit of a bank exists in information asymmetry. Compulsory information exposure can raise credit of stable banks. The more the information is exposed, the higher the stable banks' credit is. The influence of information exposure is not certain for risking banks.
出处
《重庆工商大学学报（社会科学版）》
2004年第5期40-43,共4页
Journal of Chongqing Technology and Business University：Social Science Edition
关键词
银行
信息披露
信誉
bank
information exposure
credit
