摘要
制度变迁虽然表现形式各异,但终究可以归结为相关利益主体成本-收益的一种权衡。制度需求主体的弱势和相对缺乏,使得中国的制度转变集中于政府主导的强制性变迁。通过对政府金融效用函数和Kaldor-Hicks准则的界定,文章将中国金融制度演变和选择过程纳入到成本-收益分析框架之中。作为一个展望,文章在最后对我国民间信用的发展前景进行了构想,同时对政府监管提出了更高的要求。
Although there are various forms of institutional changes, they can all be viewed as a result of the balance between the cost and benefit by relative interest parties. Due to the weakness of demand side, China's financial institutional change is mainly dominated by the government, which is termed as compelling institutional change. By using the definition of governmental utility function and Kaldor Hicks criterion, this article puts China's financial institutional change and its process into the framework of cost - benefit analysis. At the end, the article gives a prospect of the development of China's nongovernmental credit institutions, and proposes the need for better governmental super-
出处
《金融研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第11期19-28,共10页
Journal of Financial Research
