摘要
对一种具有双陷门解密机制的公钥概率加密体制的安全性进行分析,指出它存在三点不安全因素,不能抵抗选择密文攻击,攻击者通过选取适当的密文,在得到解密的明文后,能够计算出用户的私钥或分解模数,运用这些信息,攻击者可恢复所有的明文。同时,也对该加密体制作了改进,给出了一种能够抵抗适应性攻击的加密方案,防止攻击者利用获得的解密信息计算用户的私钥或分解模数,提高了加密体制的安全性。
Security analysis of an encryption scheme with a double-trapdoor decryption mechanism was provided, and three insecurities of the encryption scheme were pointed out. It suffers from adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks. By choosing proper ciphertext, the attacker can calculate the user's private key or factorize the modulus after getting the decrypted plaintext. Using this information, the attacker can extract all the plaintexts. An improvement of this encryption scheme against adaptive attack was proposed and can prevent the attacker from calculating the user's private key or factoring the modulus and strengthen its security.
出处
《通信学报》
EI
CSCD
北大核心
2004年第11期64-69,共6页
Journal on Communications
基金
国家自然科学重点基金资助项目(69931010)国家"863"基金资助项目(2002AA143021)
关键词
公钥概率加密体制
双陷门解密机制
安全性分析
适应性选择密文攻击
模数分解
probabilistic public-key encryption scheme
double trapdoor-decryption
security analysis
adaptive chosen ciphertext attack
modulus factorization
