摘要
传统意义的委托-代理框架下代理人偏离企业目标的"畸形"行为在无代理问题时也会在一定程度上存在,即使无代理问题,作为企业所有者的经理人也并不总是追求企业的利润或价值最大化。对这种无代理问题下的低效率额外成本做系统研究,并分析和探讨了企业主是自己经营还是寻求新代理人、是寻求高质量代理人还是低质量代理人、是否更换当前代理人以及寻求多少代理人等所谓的最优代理和相应的激励问题。
Some of the managers′ distorted behaviors in classical framework of principal-agency analysis may also occur when no agency problems exist. Therefore, even in sole proprietorship structure where no agency problems exist at all the managers do not necessarily maximize the firm′s profit or value as the classical economic theory assumed. This paper makes an elaborate analysis of this inefficiency costs, called Z costs, and works such so-called optimal agency problems as whether the firm should look for new managers or manage by the owner himself, whether to hire high quality or low quality managers, whether to replace present managers, how many managers should be hired and the correspondent incentive systems.
出处
《管理科学》
CSSCI
2004年第5期81-86,共6页
Journal of Management Science
关键词
代理成本
客观Z成本
主观Z成本
代理均衡
Agency costs
Objective Z costs
Subjective Z costs
Agency equilibrium
