摘要
由于缺乏"自动"改善经营绩效的市场机制,公司经理通过发行股票可以支配更多的钱而无需承担任何固定的偿还义务,而当前公共监管权力配置不足以防止经理人员的逆向选择与道德风险,致使我国上市公司陷入一个"融资—低效投资—再融资"的制度性怪圈。市场监管者有必要代表中小投资者的利益而寻求更有效的方法来控制公司经理的行为。在当前的制度背景下,基于公司经营绩效的高层管理人员任职资格审查与禁入惩罚制度可以部分地替代接管市场与经理人员市场对经理行为的约束。
Lack of automatically improving performance mechanism, the manager of listed companies can control more money but need not undertake any fixed duty through the seasoned equity offerings (SEOs). However, the experience of supervision nowadays cannot prevent manager from moral hazard and adverse selection. Thus, the performance of listed companies falls into a vicious cycle. The stock market supervisors should seek more efficient methods to monitor the refinance for the benefits of small investors. The system of examining and approving qualification of high-level managers according to the results of operation can restrain the behavior of managers instead of inefficient market.
出处
《云南财贸学院学报》
2003年第4期28-32,共5页
Journal of Yunnan Finance and Trade Institute
关键词
上市公司
公司治理
再融资
市场监管
Listed Company
Corporate Governance
Seasoned Equity Offerings
Market Supervision
