摘要
与小股东相比,大股东具有监督的比较优势。但监督的公共产品性质使得大股东不可能尽全力对经理进行监督和干预,甚至可能与经理合谋侵吞小股东利益来为自己谋取私利。在大股东—小股东—经理三人博弈框架中,大股东和经理都具有触发合谋战略的动机。当公司治理缺乏效率,使得大股东和经理能够从合谋行为中得到正的合谋剩余时,大股东和经理就会做出合谋的理性选择,合谋均衡因而形成。
Comparing with small shareholders, the large shareholders are dominant insupervision. However, the larger shareholders are impossible to do their best for supervision andintervention due to the characteristic of the public product of supervision, even collusion with themanagers to peculate small shareholders' revenue to improve the private benefit. In the framework ofthree--player game, it exists motivation between large shareholder and manager for the collusion.When corporate governance is lake of efficiency, both large shareholder and manager gain collusionresidual from the collusion, they will make a rational choice of collusion, and then collusionequilibrium would be formed.
出处
《华中科技大学学报（社会科学版）》
2004年第4期71-74,共4页
Journal of Huazhong University of Science and Technology(Social Science Edition)
关键词
大股东
经理
合谋
监督
公司治理结构
large shareholder
manager
collusion
corporate governance
