摘要
笔者针对我国农业标准化推广程度较低的现状,以农民专业合作社核心成员为激励对象,分析在农业标准化推广过程中存在的双重委托代理关系,构建了双重多任务委托代理模型。研究表明,核心成员在标准化推广监督任务上的努力水平受其风险偏好、风险规避程度、标准化推广监督任务风险程度与绩效系数、地方政府的激励系数等因素的影响。根据理论研究的结论,笔者还结合天津市曙光沙窝萝卜专业合作社的农业标准化推广实践,进一步印证了该理论模型。
This paper analyzes the double principal-agent relationship in popularizing agricultural standardization in China. Then,this paper builds double multitask principal-agent model by taking the core members in farmers' professional cooperatives as incentive objects. The results show that the effort level of supervising standardization task of the core members is influenced by the risk preference,the degree of risk aversion,the risk degree of supervising the promotion of standardization and the performance coefficient,the incentive coefficient of local government and other factors. Finally,combined with the promotion of agricultural standardization in Tianjin Shuguang Sha Wo radish professional cooperatives,this paper explains the positive significance of policy suggestions on the model.
出处
《经济经纬》
CSSCI
北大核心
2015年第1期37-42,共6页
Economic Survey
基金
教育部人文社会科学规划基金项目(10YJA630014)
关键词
农民专业合作社
农业标准化推广
双重委托代理
核心成员
Farmers' Professional Cooperatives
Popularizing Agricultural Standardization
Dual Multitask Principal-agent
Core Producers
