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从博弈的角度看国有股减持及其定价 被引量:5

Game Analysis on the Process of the Convertibility of the State-owned Shares in China's Stock Market and Its Pricing
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摘要 本文从完全信息静态博弈和完全信息动态博弈的角度,对国有股减持问题进行了分析。我们认为国有股减持应尽快实施,因为其拖延会使博弈双方的成本持续上升。 流通股股东无论从理论上还是实际结果看,国有股减持的定价都应以净资产值为基础。 The paper analyses the convertibility of state-owned shares from the two perspectives of static game and dynamic game theory. We hold that it should be carried out as soon as possible, for its postponing will incessantly increase the cost of the two parties of the game. Whether it is seen from the theoretical prospective or actual results, the pricing of the convertibility of state-owned shares should be based on the value of net assets.
出处 《财经研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2004年第8期71-78,共8页 Journal of Finance and Economics
关键词 国有股减持 博弈 纳什均衡 convertibility of the state-owned shares game theory Nash equilibrium
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参考文献6

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