摘要
本文把委托—代理理论应用于证券监管的研究中,试图提出判别一个监管政策的好坏的事前标准。为给出这一标准,本文提出了激励相容度的概念——激励相容度越高则监管政策就越有效。本文的分析表明:在我国证券监管中,要制定一个有效的监管政策,首先要改变目前我国监管政策中对券商和上市公司行动的不合理惩罚和激励制度,并且加大对内幕交易的投资者行为的惩罚力度,以杜绝内幕交易;建立有助于促进券商和上市公司选择有利于投资者的长远利益和市场的长远发展的行动机制,以不断减少我国证券市场中的投机行为。其次,本文还分析了减少我国证券市场监管信息不对称和加强监管力度对提高我国证券监管政策有效性的意义。但应该指出的是,由于本文模型所需信息搜集的困难,所以给出的模型仍然属于一个探索性的理论标准。
This article applies the theory of principal-agent into the research of the security market regulation,and based on the analysis of the micro-behavior on the agents of the security market,give a prior-criterion that identifies whether a regulation policy is good or not.To obtain this prior-criterion,this article gives a conception of incentive compatibility-the higher this value is,the more effective the regulation policies are.This article shows that it is necessary to formulate a effective regulation policy that changing the unreasonable punishment rule and incentive mechanism in China market and continuously deceasing the speculations.Finally,this article also shows that decreasing the asymmetricity of information and enforcing the regulation play a important role in improving the effectives of the regulation policies.
出处
《兰州商学院学报》
2012年第3期54-58,共5页
Journal of Lanzhou Commercial College
基金
2005年国家社科基金项目"中国资本市场监管有效性研究"(05BJL028)
2011年国家社科基金重点项目"我国资本市场系统稳定性评估和监测研究"(11AZD010)
关键词
委托—代理
激励相容
证券监管
政策有效性
principal-agent
incentive compatibility
security market regulation
the effectiveness of the policies
