摘要
针对我国目前偷漏税现象比较严重的现实,通过建立博弈模型系统,阐明了以相应的制度建设来激励税务人员加强税收监管,从而减少税收流失的解决思路,同时证明了这一思路比单纯加强惩罚力度成本更底、更有效。最后,给出了包括设计纳税人主动纳税的激励相容机制、税务人员采用个人负责制以及采用税收倒推制等在内的具体政策建议。
With a view to the serious tax evasion in China, the article demonstrates by building a game theory model the idea that establishing the corresponding system or policy to remunerate and encourage tax collectors can strengthen their tax supervision so as to reduce tax evasion. At the same time, the model proves that the encouraging system js better than penalization only. Finally, the authours put forward some other proposals to protect taxation, such as individual responsibility system and the system of remuneration for active taxpayer,etc.
出处
《北京工业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2004年第2期34-37,共4页
Journal of Beijing University of Technology (Social Sciences Edition)
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70073018)
关键词
纳税人
逃税
博弈论
税收监管
模型
taxpayer
tax evasion
game theory
tax supervision
model
