摘要
通过建立基于知识互补性假设的两人知识互换效用函数,运用无限次重复囚徒困境博弈模型,分析了企业内员工间知识互换的主要障碍和解决途径。研究表明,在无限次重复博弈中,如果对于不合作的制裁威胁是可信的且未来收益的贴现因子足够大,则有效的知识互换均衡是可以达到的。
In this paper, we study the knowledge barter between staffs within a firm by introducing the utility function of knowledge barter and using an Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma (IPD) game-theoretic model. We find that, in the iterated repeated game, the efficient equilibrium of knowledge barter is possible and reachable if the threat to sanction the staffs who does not barter his knowledge with others is credible and the discount factor of future payoff is large enough.
出处
《科学学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2004年第z1期120-122,共3页
Studies in Science of Science
关键词
知识管理
知识互换
重复囚徒困境博弈
知识互换效用函数
knowledge management
knowledge barter
iterated prisoner’s dilemma (IPD)
utility function of knowledge barter
