摘要
本文结合浙江省温州市湖岭镇周浩呈会的运作情况,介绍了呈会一般的运作模式、利率计算、会员的合作方式以及风险控制等。文章引用博弈分析方法,认为呈会会员得会者与不得会者间选择(合作,合作)是一个纯战略均衡,但该均衡成立是有条件的,由此引出呈会风险控制的两大机制。
Based on the case of Chenghui ROSCAS from Wenzhou City of Zhejiang Province,this paper introduces the general operating measures,the interest calculation,the cooperative relationship among members with regard to the ROSCAS.Through the game theory analysis,this paper holds that the choice (cooperation,cooperation)between the non-members and members of Chenghui ROSCAS is a pure stra- tegic equilibrium.However,that the equilibrium is conditional has resulted in two risk controlling mech- anisms.
出处
《华南农业大学学报（社会科学版）》
2006年第S1期241-245,250,共6页
Journal of South China Agricultural University(Social Science Edition)
关键词
互助会
呈会
温州
运作方式
利率决定
ROSCAS
Chenghui ROSCAS
Wenzhou
operating Modes
interest-rate deciding
