摘要
改革开放过程中政府干预的正当性一直饱受争议。基于此,本文首先从资源禀赋差异的视角入手,构建了一个包含资本税、贸易开放"补偿效应"的H-O理论分析框架,来探究贸易开放过程中政府的干预逻辑。研究发现:(1)富人效用水平和政府税收之间存在"倒U"形关系;(2)当政府以税收来提供公共服务时,富人与穷人都存在一个福利改善的政府干预区间或税收区间;(3)随着贸易开放的深化,分工效应会使富人和穷人所需的政府干预上限上升和下限下降,进而使得政府的可干预区间扩大;(4)在贸易开放过程中,劳动密集型国家或地区的政府可干预区间扩大的幅度更为显著,原因在于其穷人福利改进下限向下拉动的作用是资本密集型国家的近4倍。本文又对其进行了较为准确的数值模拟,模拟结果有效支撑了以上的发现。
The legitimacy of government intervention in the process of reform and opening-up has been a controversial issue.Based on this perspective,this paper constructed a Heckscher-Ohlin model to provide an analytical framework,which included capital tax and a Compensation Effect for trade opening from the perspective of resource endowment differentials,and used it to explore the logic of government intervention in the process of trade opening.This study finds that:(1)there is an inverted U-shape relationship between the level of utility of the rich and government taxes;(2)when the government provides public services from tax revenue,there is a government intervention interval or tax interval for both the rich and the poor,during which the welfare of both groups improves;(3)as trade liberalization deepens,the effect on the division of labor will increase the upper limit and decrease the lower limit of government intervention required by both the rich and the poor,thus expanding the government’s intervention interval;(4)in the process of trade opening,the government intervention interval has been expanded more significantly in labor-intensive countries because their lower limit of welfare improvement for the poor is nearly four times as much as that of capital-intensive countries.Then,this paper offers a relatively accurate numerical simulation of the issue,and the simulation results effectively support the above findings.
出处
《国际贸易问题》
CSSCI
北大核心
2020年第1期32-50,共19页
Journal of International Trade
基金
国家自然科学基金项目“老年劳动参与率变化机制研究:基于内生退休理论的解释和政策干预”(71503154)
上海财经大学2019年研究生创新基金项目“价格干预VS数量干预:社会保障领域道德风险治理机制研究”(CXJJ-2019-375).
关键词
资源禀赋
贸易开放
政府干预
帕累托改进
Resource Endowment
Trade Opening
Government Intervention
Pareto Improvement
