摘要
本文首先指出构建了双寡头垄断企业即新浪与腾讯在微博APP上的技术创新的收益函数,并且在此基础上运用古诺模型求解博弈状态下的纳什均衡产量,同时对双寡头垄断竞争企业的技术创新进行了定量分析,说明企业的技术创新有一个最佳的技术含量。且随着技术创新含量的变化对企业的利润也会产生影响。
The paper first points out that the revenue function of the technological innovation of Sina and Tencent on the Weibo APP is constructed,and based on this,the Cournot model is used to solve the Nash equilibrium output in the abandoned state,and at the same time,the competition of the duopoly The quantitative analysis of the technological innovation of the enterprise shows that the technological innovation of the enterprise has an optimal technological content.And with the change in the content of technological innovation,it will also have an impact on corporate profits.
关键词
双寡头垄断
技术创新
博弈
duopoly
technological innovation
game
