摘要
同等效率竞争者(as efficient competitor,AEC)原则及测试被欧盟反垄断机构用于对排他性滥用行为的效果进行量化分析,以界定此类滥用行为的市场封锁和反竞争效应。2022年判决的欧盟委员会诉Intel有条件折扣案、高通排他性支付案以及谷歌非法限制案中,欧盟委员会所提供的AEC测试结果都受到了法院的质疑并被全部或部分否定,这表明各方对于AEC分析原则及测试方面的理解和应用仍存在很大差异,AEC的未来应用充满挑战,AEC原则和测试相关的理论基础和应用边界还有待深入分析和研究。为此,本文借助学术文献以及欧盟反垄断法规和判例,从AEC原则及测试相关概念的来源和AEC测试的经济学原理出发,根据AEC在欧盟反垄断方面的具体规定,选取涉及AEC测试的排他性定价、掠夺性定价、选择性降价、有条件折扣以及利润挤压等具体判例进行对比和分析,以便完善对AEC分析的全面认识,弥补国内相关研究的缺失,并为未来国内反垄断工作在排他性滥用行为方面的量化分析和精准计算提供参考。
The As Efficient Competitor(AEC)principle and test are used by EU antitrust authorities to quantify the effects of exclusive abuse in order to define the market blocking and anti-competitive effects of such abuse.The AEC test results adopted by the European Commission in the case of European Commission v.Intel Conditional Rebate,the case of Qualcomm Exclusive Payment and the case of Google Illegal restriction ended in 2022 were all challenged and overturned by the court,which indicates that there are still big differences in the understanding and application of principles and tests related to AEC analysis.The future application of AEC is full of challenges,and the theoretical basis and application boundaries of AEC principle and test need to be further analyzed and studied.Therefore,with the help of academic literature and EU antitrust regulations and real anti-trust case judgments,this article describes the sources of AEC principles and AEC test-related concepts as well as the economic principles of AEC testing.According to the specific provisions of AEC in EU antitrust,specific cases involving AEC testing such as exclusive pricing,predatory pricing,selective price reduction,conditional discount and profit squeeze are selected for comparison and analysis,so as to improve the comprehensive understanding of AEC analysis and make up for the lack of relevant research in China.It also provides reference for the quantitative analysis and precise calculation of exclusive abuse in the future domestic anti-monopoly work.
出处
《产业经济评论（山东）》
2023年第2期1-24,共24页
Review of Industrial Economics
