摘要
自从2010年腾讯与奇虎的“3q大战”以来,平台企业强制商家“二选一”以及平台间相互屏蔽的排他行为愈演愈烈,给双边市场上的用户带来了诸多不便,引起了社会各界的广泛关注。本研究在Hotelling横向选择模型的基础上进行了拓展,通过模型构建以及数值算例分析的方法,研究了平台企业在商家侧、消费者侧开展排他性竞争对平台价格策略和社会福利的影响。研究结果表明,通过开展排他性竞争,平台可以制定更高的价格从而获利。当两个平台间排他强度同时达到一定强度时,社会总福利下降,在特殊情况下社会福利则有所上升,但这种上升也是舍弃了部分市场参与者的利益而达成的。在进行反垄断治理时,社会总福利的增减并不能作为治理的唯一判断标准,且市场双边两种形态的排他行为均需要引起重视。
Since the"3q War"between Tencent and Qihoo in 2010,the"pick one of two"strategies implemented by platforms and resulted"walled garden"have brought a lot of inconvenience to users in two-sided markets.It has attracted extensive attention from all sectors of society.Based on the Hotelling model,this study applied model construction and numerical example method,focused on the influence of exclusive competition on price strategy and social welfare when platforms carrying out exclusive measures on the seller-side and the buyer-side.The results showed that exclusive competition allows platforms to set higher prices and earn profit.When the exclusivity intensity between the two platforms reaches a certain value,the total social welfare would decrease.Under special market circumstances,the social welfare increases,but this increase can only be achieved at the expense of the interests of some market participants.In the process of anti-monopoly governance,the increase or decrease of the total social welfare can not be used as the only standard for effective governance,and the two forms of exclusive competition of the two-sided market both need to be taken seriously.
作者
彭赓
王妍沣
顾聪
刘颖
PENG Geng;WANG Yanfeng;GU Cong;LIU Ying(School of Economics and Management,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190;Sino-Danish College,University of Chinese Academy of Sciences,Beijing 100190)
出处
《科技促进发展》
2023年第4期250-258,共9页
Science & Technology for Development
基金
2020年国家自然科学基金面上项目(71972174):电商平台大数据杀熟的形成机制、效应和治理研究,负责人:彭赓
关键词
双边市场
平台竞争
排他性交易
互联互通
互联网反垄断
two-sided market
platform competition
exclusive competition
walled garden
internet antitrust
