摘要
本文以中国融资融券试点与扩容作为卖空限制减少的外生事件,使用渐进双重差分模型全面研究融券卖空对企业应计与真实盈余管理行为的影响。研究发现,相比于控制组公司,融券卖空标的公司具有更低的应计盈余管理水平;而且该现象主要存在于高管股权激励水平较低以及分析师追踪人数较少的公司。进一步分析发现,融券卖空标的公司进行了更多的真实盈余操纵,表明企业在应计盈余管理受限之后,转而选择更为隐蔽的真实盈余管理行为。本文研究结论有助于进一步认识融券卖空交易的治理作用,为完善融资融券交易的治理职能提供了理论支持和经验证据。
This paper examine the impact of short selling on corporate accrual and real earnings management using a generalized Difference-in-Difference model.The results show that compared with control group firms,margin trading firms have lower accrued earnings management levels,especially among firms with low managerial stock incentives and fewer analysts following.We further find that,contrary to accrual earnings management,there are more real earnings management in short selling firms,indicating that those firms react to the limited accrual earnings management by switching to a more subtle real earnings management.The conclusions of this paper are helpful to comprehensively understand and evaluate the governance effect of margin trading,and provide theoretical support or empirical evidence for improving the governance effect of margin trading.
作者
熊家财
胡琛
郭雪静
Jiacai Xiong;Chen Hu;Xuejing Guo
出处
《会计论坛》
2020年第1期-,共13页
Accounting Forum
基金
国家自然科学基金项目(71562015)
江西省教育厅科技项目(GJJ170353)
关键词
融资融券
融券卖空
应计盈余管理
真实盈余管理
渐进双重差分
Margin Trading
Short Selling
Accrual Earnings Management
Real Earnings Management
Generalized Difference-in-Difference
