摘要
本文以2007-2018年A股上市公司数据从融资约束角度考察高管纵向兼任对财务报告稳健性的影响。研究发现,高管纵向兼任会降低会计稳健性,这一作用在董事长纵向兼任时更加明显。机制检验发现,高管纵向兼任主要通过缓解企业融资约束降低会计稳健性,具体表现为存在高管纵向兼任的企业内部资本市场活跃度更高,更可能获得集团内部关联方借款担保、获得担保的次数越多、担保金额也越大。进一步研究发现,仅在非国有企业高管纵向兼任对会计稳健性存在显著影响,且纵向兼任导致的会计稳健性降低并未加剧大股东掏空。本文拓展了高管纵向兼任经济后果及会计稳健性影响因素的相关研究,对完善公司治理及加强政府监管具有启示意义。
This paper examines the impact of vertical interlock on accounting conservatism from the perspective of financing constraints.Using samples of Chinese listed companies from 2007 to 2018 in China,this study finds that:Vertical interlock significantly reduces the accounting conservatism,and compared to CEOs interlock,only the vertical chairmen have a significant impact on accounting conservatism.Mechanism tests show that vertical interlock mainly reduces the accounting conservatism by alleviating corporate financing constraints,specifically,companies with vertical interlock have higher activity in internal capital markets,are more likely to obtain loans guaranteed by related parties within the group,have more frequent guarantees,and larger guarantee amounts.Further research indicates that only in non-state-owned enterprises does vertical interlock have a significant impact on accounting conservatism,and the decrease in accounting conservatism caused by vertical interlock does not exacerbate controlling shareholders'tunneling.This study expands on the economic consequences of vertical interlock and factors influencing accounting conservatism,and also provides insights for improving corporate governance and strengthening government regulation.
出处
《会计研究》
北大核心
2024年第2期74-86,共13页
Accounting Research
基金
国家自然科学基金面上项目(72272164、71872196)
国家社会科学基金项目(23CTJ024)
关键词
高管纵向兼任
会计稳健性
纵向兼任高管类型
融资约束
Vertical Interlock
Accounting Conservatism
Types of Vertical Interlock
Financing Constraints
