摘要
在关于自然类问题的讨论中,以博伊德为代表的实用主义阵营认为,基于自然类在科学实践中的实用性,自然类可以达到实在论的承诺;而一些批评者则认为实用的自然类无法承诺实在,博伊德的方案是失败的。文章对博伊德的实用主义自然类的实在论证进行了分析与重构,考察了批评者对博伊德论证中的热情主义认识论、可投射性与内稳态性质簇等前提的质疑。实用主义自然类的根本问题在于其采用了一种放宽的实在论划定,这既无法达到深的实在论承诺,也无法实现自身所设定的形而上学和自然主义目标。
In the discussion of natural kinds,the pragmatist camp represented by Boyd believes that natural kinds can commit reality based on scientific practice.Some critics argue that pragmatist natural kinds cannot commit reality and that Boyd’s scheme is a failure.This paper analyzes and reconstructs the realist argument of Boyd’s pragmatist natural kinds,and examines the critics about the premises in Boyd’s argument such as enthusiastic epistemology,projectibility and homeostasis property cluster.The fundamental problem of the pragmatist natural kinds is that it adopts a kind of relaxed realism demarcation,which can achieve neither the deep realist commitment nor the metaphysical and naturalist goal set by itself.
作者
杨军洁
YANG Jun-jie(Department of Philosophy,Peking University,Beijing 100091,China)
出处
《科学技术哲学研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第2期30-36,共7页
Studies in Philosophy of Science and Technology
关键词
自然类
实用主义
科学实在论
内稳态性质簇
博伊德
natural kinds
pragmatism
scientific realism
homeostatic property cluster
Boyd
