摘要
作为一种有影响力的同一性理论,布尔诺关于同一性的“必要性论证”是不成立的。他颠倒了观念学与本体论的关系;他所说的基础性并不是本体论上的基础性,而是观念学上的原始性,但后者必须服务于本体论上的实质性;他未能看到可区分性对于同一性是必要的;他关于个体和量化的论证以及对量子力学中的“非个体”的反驳也不令人满意。鉴于此,一种基于“超内涵观点”的替代方案值得考虑:同一性是我们的思想和言说强加于世界的,而不是事物自身的本体论特征;同一性的观念学必须依赖于它的本体论;即便思想和言说中的同一性概念是值得保留的,它也不是一个原始概念。
As an influential theory of identity,Bueno’s necessity argument of identity is untenable.He reversed the relationship between ideology and ontology;The fundamentality he said is not the ontological fundamentality,but the ideological primitives,and the latter must serve the ontological substantiality.He failed to recognize that discernibility is necessary to identity,and his arguments about the individual and quantification as well as his refutation of the“non-individual”in quantum mechanics were unsatisfactory.I propose a alternative approach,i.e.,a hyper-intensional view:identity is imposed on the world by our thoughts and words,rather than an ontological feature of things themselves;the epistemology of identity must depend on its ontology;even if the concept of identity in thought and speech is worth preserving,it is not an original concept.
作者
陈常燊
CHEN Chang-shen(School of Philosophy and Sociology,Shanxi University,Taiyuan 030006,China)
出处
《自然辩证法研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2023年第6期52-58,共7页
Studies in Dialectics of Nature
基金
2019年度国家社科基金重点项目“分析的西方哲学史研究”(19AZX013)
2021年度国家社科基金后期资助一般项目“维特根斯坦与寂静主义研究”(21FZXB042)。
关键词
同一性
不可区分性
基础性
实质性
超内涵
identity
indiscernibility
fundamentality
substantiality
hyper-intensionality
