摘要
本文利用中国家族上市公司股权分置改革前后的季度时间数据,实证研究股份全流通纠正终极控制者利益取向的有效性,进而对股改的公司治理效果做出判断。股权分置带来的弊端是持有非流通股的公司控制者利益取向与公司市场价值的背离,产生严重的代理成本并阻碍我国资本市场的健康发展。全流通之后股权定价基础的一致,是否带来了终极控制者利益取向有所回归于上市公司价值?本文的研究表明:股权分置改革的确导致了大部分家族终极控制权的下降,不过一些家族终极控制者通过收购股权、定向增发等形式来巩固对上市公司的控制权;股改之后家族终极控制者掏空上市公司的程度呈显著下降;进一步研究发现,股改之后家族终极控制者的掏空动机发生了显著改善。全流通确实有效地纠正了上市公司终极控制者的利益取向。
The worst weakness resulting from split-share structure in China is the inconsistency between controller＇s private benefits and firm＇s value, which induces serious agent-costs. The split-share structure reform that has been implemented from April 2005 removes market fraction and helps to eliminate the confliction from the view of theory. This paper constructs a ＂difference in difference＂ model by adopting the China＇s public trade firms ultimately controlled by families and the analysis framework of pyramidal ownership. The empirical results indicate the split-share reform indeed improves public-trade firms governance and help to remove the confliction between the ultimate controller＇s benefits and firm＇s valuation, regarding to those firms ultimate controlled by families.
出处
《经济研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2008年第8期77-89,共13页
Economic Research Journal
基金
国家社会科学基金“股权分置改革对我国资本市场和公司治理的影响研究”(08BJY151)阶段性研究成果
关键词
股权分置改革
金字塔式股权结构
过度负债
双重差分
Split-Share Structure Reform
Pyramidal Ownership
Excess Debt
Difference in Difference
