摘要
本文从国有企业现有的选拔机制和激励机制出发,探讨了国企经营者在利润报告上的行为选择问题。博弈分析发现选拔机制将导致激励机制难以发挥作用,即使将经营者收入与报告利润挂钩也难以阻止经营者的作假行为。存在着经营者为自身地位而低报利润的可能,且当社会普遍认为国有企业效益不佳时,其造假的可能性也更大。
This paper discusses managers＂ behaviors on profit reporting, based on the exiting manager--select and incentive mechanisms of state--owned enterprises in China. Equilibriums of game show that the selecting mechanism will make the incentive ones difficult to play its roles, and false accounts can＇t be stopped even manager＇s income are hooked on the book profit. Managers may disguise profit in order to protect their position. When ＂low＂ benefit in state-owned enterprises is generally recognized, they are more likely to make a cheat.
出处
《中国管理科学》
CSSCI
2007年第1期136-141,共6页
Chinese Journal of Management Science
基金
教育部人文社会科学基金项目(02JA790062)
关键词
国有企业
选拔机制
不完全信息动态博弈
state-- owned enterprise
selecting-- mechanism
dynamic game of incomplete information
