摘要
本文研究了我国1998—2001年间上市公司首次配股后会计业绩下降的现象。实证结果表明,配股公司在配股前存在盈余管理行为,无后续融资行为公司配股后业绩下降且操控性应计利润在配股后发生反转,这为配股前盈余管理机会主义观提供了直接证据；有后续融资行为公司在配股后仍进行盈余管理以继续尽可能维持较高业绩。这两类公司配股后现金流的减少表明,配股前盈余管理仅能为配股后业绩下降提供部分解释。本文研究发现意味着,限制公司管理层在配股前的盈余管理机会主义行为,并非避免配股后业绩下降的唯一手段,如何提高配股后资金使用效率应该是保护投资者利益的又一重要方面。
This paper studies the decline in accounting performance after the earliest rights issues in China's capital market from 1998 to 2001.As for the listed companies not to continue to issue,the discretionary accruals'reversal around the rights issues provide the di- rect evidence for the opportunism of pre-issue earnings management.But the companies planning to subsequently issue continue to man- age earnings to maintain performance as high as possible.The deterioration of all companies'CFO implies the pre-issue earning manage- ment can only partially explain the underperformance of the rights issues.Our evidence shows that it is not unique way to protect inves- tor through limiting the opportunism of pre-issue earnings management.Another important way is companies'investment efficiency fol- lowing the rights issue.
出处
《会计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2006年第8期52-59,共8页
Accounting Research
基金
本研究受到国家自然科学基金的资助(项目批准号:70532002)。
