摘要
对高速公路PPP项目中存在的机会主义行为进行演化博弈及仿真分析。政府可选择不同的监管方式进行监管,考虑到现实情况每种监管方式对机会主义行为的成功查处都具有一定概率。最后通过演化博弈及仿真分析双方构成系统的渐近稳定性,根据系统达到最优稳定策略所需条件,发现政府采取过程监管且提升监管技术手段,增加社会资本方选择机会主义行为时的成本时,可以有效减少社会资本方选择机会主义行为。
This paper analyzes the opportunism behavior in the highway PPP projects by evolutionary game and stirnulation.The government can choose different models of supervision.Considering the reality,each model of supervision has a certain probability for the successful investigation of opportunistic behavior.Finally through evolutionary game and simulation analysis to study the asymptotic stability of the system,according to the conditions are required for the system to achieve the optimal stability strategy,finds that the government can effectively reduce the selection of opportunistic behavior strategy by the social capital when process supervision is adopted and the regulation technique is improved,and increase the cost of the social capital in choosing opportunistic behavior strategy.
作者
李洁云
申科
LI Jieyun;SHEN Ke(Yunnan Science Research Institute of Communications,Kunming 650051,China)
出处
《建筑经济》
北大核心
2020年第S02期121-125,共5页
Construction Economy
基金
云南省交通运输厅科技项目“基于大数据的云南省公路货物运输量统计算法研究”(云交科2017(A)07)
