The competition and cooperation between traditional telecom operators and resale operators in the supply chain are discussed, when the telecom industry developed telecommunication resale service. Supply chain contract...The competition and cooperation between traditional telecom operators and resale operators in the supply chain are discussed, when the telecom industry developed telecommunication resale service. Supply chain contract is an effective way to coordinate the supply chain. This paper analyzes the revenue-sharing contract between telecom operators and resale operators. The study shows that by setting up a rational revenue-sharing ratio and wholesale price, a revenue-sharing contract can coordinate this supply chain, and telecom operators and resale operators can achieve a 'win-win' solution.展开更多
Service providers often adopt the mechanism of customer classification due to the heterogeneity of customer waiting cost. However, the classification service may cause unfairness feeling of regular customers, then aff...Service providers often adopt the mechanism of customer classification due to the heterogeneity of customer waiting cost. However, the classification service may cause unfairness feeling of regular customers, then affect the revenue and social welfare. This paper provides the first exact analysis about the situation that service providers offer two classes of non-preemptive priority service when customer fairness perception is explicitly modeled. We model customer fairness perception as a negative utility on regular customers that’s proportional to the waiting time difference between the two queues. By analyzing a stylized M/M/1 queue in monopoly service system, we can derive important results some of which reaffirm existed research results. First, from the perspective of revenue maximization, service providers should adopt the mechanism of customer classification and set up the two kinds of customers where they can see each other. Next, considering customer utility maximization,service providers should cancel the mechanism of customer classification, and keep one queue(regular customers) only. Then, from the perspective of social welfare maximization, service providers shouldalso adopt the mechanism of customer classification but set up the two kinds of customers where they cannot feel each other. Finally, this paper concludes the optimal pricing based on customer classification in the above three different perspectives. This research shows important reference value and practical significance for service providers who adopt the mechanism of classification service.展开更多
文摘The competition and cooperation between traditional telecom operators and resale operators in the supply chain are discussed, when the telecom industry developed telecommunication resale service. Supply chain contract is an effective way to coordinate the supply chain. This paper analyzes the revenue-sharing contract between telecom operators and resale operators. The study shows that by setting up a rational revenue-sharing ratio and wholesale price, a revenue-sharing contract can coordinate this supply chain, and telecom operators and resale operators can achieve a 'win-win' solution.
基金National Natural Science Foundation of China(71671092,71301075)the Postdoctoral Science Foundation Funded Project of Jiangsu Province,China(1501040A)National Key Research and Development Program:Key Projects of International Scientific and Technological Innovation Cooperation Between Governments(2016YFE0108000)
文摘Service providers often adopt the mechanism of customer classification due to the heterogeneity of customer waiting cost. However, the classification service may cause unfairness feeling of regular customers, then affect the revenue and social welfare. This paper provides the first exact analysis about the situation that service providers offer two classes of non-preemptive priority service when customer fairness perception is explicitly modeled. We model customer fairness perception as a negative utility on regular customers that’s proportional to the waiting time difference between the two queues. By analyzing a stylized M/M/1 queue in monopoly service system, we can derive important results some of which reaffirm existed research results. First, from the perspective of revenue maximization, service providers should adopt the mechanism of customer classification and set up the two kinds of customers where they can see each other. Next, considering customer utility maximization,service providers should cancel the mechanism of customer classification, and keep one queue(regular customers) only. Then, from the perspective of social welfare maximization, service providers shouldalso adopt the mechanism of customer classification but set up the two kinds of customers where they cannot feel each other. Finally, this paper concludes the optimal pricing based on customer classification in the above three different perspectives. This research shows important reference value and practical significance for service providers who adopt the mechanism of classification service.
