AODV(Ad hoc on-dem and d istance vector)路由协议效率高,控制开销小,操作简单,但本身没有任何安全机制,对安全性攻击尤其是黑洞攻击表现脆弱。针对该问题,文中在详细分析了AODV路由协议的运行原理和数据黑洞攻击问题实质的基础上对A...AODV(Ad hoc on-dem and d istance vector)路由协议效率高,控制开销小,操作简单,但本身没有任何安全机制,对安全性攻击尤其是黑洞攻击表现脆弱。针对该问题,文中在详细分析了AODV路由协议的运行原理和数据黑洞攻击问题实质的基础上对AODV协议进行了改进。利用G loMoS im仿真工具对改进的AODV路由协议进行了仿真实验,结果表明,该方案可以有效的解决数据黑洞攻击问题,同时不会过多地增加时延和协议开销。展开更多
Mobile ad hoc networks are particularly vulnerable to denial of service （DOS） attacks launched through compromised nodes or intruders. In this paper, we present a new DOS attack and its defense in ad hoc networks. T...Mobile ad hoc networks are particularly vulnerable to denial of service （DOS） attacks launched through compromised nodes or intruders. In this paper, we present a new DOS attack and its defense in ad hoc networks. The new DOS attack, called AA hoc Flooding Attack（AHFA）, is that intruder broadcasts mass Route Request packets to exhaust the communication bandwidth and node resource so that the valid communication can not be kept. After analyzed AM hoc Flooding Attack, we develop Flooding Attack Prevention （FAP）, a genetic defense against the AM hoc Flooding Attack. When the intruder broadcasts exceeding packets of Route Request, the immediate neighbors of the intruder record the rate of Route Request. Once the threshold is exceeded, nodes deny any future request packets from the intruder. The results of our implementation show FAP can prevent the AM hoe Flooding attack efficiently.展开更多
文摘AODV(Ad hoc on-dem and d istance vector)路由协议效率高,控制开销小,操作简单,但本身没有任何安全机制,对安全性攻击尤其是黑洞攻击表现脆弱。针对该问题,文中在详细分析了AODV路由协议的运行原理和数据黑洞攻击问题实质的基础上对AODV协议进行了改进。利用G loMoS im仿真工具对改进的AODV路由协议进行了仿真实验,结果表明,该方案可以有效的解决数据黑洞攻击问题,同时不会过多地增加时延和协议开销。
基金This project was supported by the National"863"High Technology Development Programof China (2003AA148010) Key Technologies R&D Programof China (2002DA103A03 -07)
文摘Mobile ad hoc networks are particularly vulnerable to denial of service （DOS） attacks launched through compromised nodes or intruders. In this paper, we present a new DOS attack and its defense in ad hoc networks. The new DOS attack, called AA hoc Flooding Attack（AHFA）, is that intruder broadcasts mass Route Request packets to exhaust the communication bandwidth and node resource so that the valid communication can not be kept. After analyzed AM hoc Flooding Attack, we develop Flooding Attack Prevention （FAP）, a genetic defense against the AM hoc Flooding Attack. When the intruder broadcasts exceeding packets of Route Request, the immediate neighbors of the intruder record the rate of Route Request. Once the threshold is exceeded, nodes deny any future request packets from the intruder. The results of our implementation show FAP can prevent the AM hoe Flooding attack efficiently.
