The well-known Braess paradox in congestion games states that adding an additional road to a transportation network may increase the total travel time, and consequently decrease the overall efficiency. This paper pres...The well-known Braess paradox in congestion games states that adding an additional road to a transportation network may increase the total travel time, and consequently decrease the overall efficiency. This paper presents a paradox in a similar spirit and involves a distributed resource allocation game on networks, namely the power allocation game between countries developed in Li and Morse(2017). The paradox is that by having additional friends may actually decrease a country's total welfare in equilibrium. Conditions for this paradox to occur as well as the price of anarchy results are also derived.展开更多
基金supported by the National Science Foundation(1607101.00)USAir Force(FA9550-16-1-0290)
文摘The well-known Braess paradox in congestion games states that adding an additional road to a transportation network may increase the total travel time, and consequently decrease the overall efficiency. This paper presents a paradox in a similar spirit and involves a distributed resource allocation game on networks, namely the power allocation game between countries developed in Li and Morse(2017). The paradox is that by having additional friends may actually decrease a country's total welfare in equilibrium. Conditions for this paradox to occur as well as the price of anarchy results are also derived.
