This article examines the criticisms and debates about Cornell realism.While critics,like Shafer-Landau,Tropman,Oliveira and Perrine,reject the claim by Cornell realism that moral knowledge can be empirically investig...This article examines the criticisms and debates about Cornell realism.While critics,like Shafer-Landau,Tropman,Oliveira and Perrine,reject the claim by Cornell realism that moral knowledge can be empirically investigated the same as natural science is,I argue that some of their arguments are not sufficient to refute Cornell realism.What is crucial in assessing Cornell realism is distinguishing normative ethics from empirical science.While ethics is normative in nature,that of empirical science is descriptive and predictive.I also show that the debate between Tropman and Long is at cross purposes in their discussion about the nature of moral knowledge.By clarifying different meanings of moral knowledge,I argue that while arguments by Cornell realism can be applied to moral psychology,the study of normative ethics through empirical investigation still faces the problem of an is-ought gap.Indeed,many of Cornell realist arguments are begging many questions.I have also examined recent debates on normativity objection by Parfit and Copp.I argue that Copp’s naturalism is very similar to Huemer’s intuitionism.Copp’s argument of non-analytical naturalism seems to support rather than refute moral intuitionism.展开更多
This paper reflects on the challenge that emotivism in moral philosophy sets for traditional cultures rooted in and shaped by natural wisdom. One could argue that Western and Chinese civilizations remain utterly incom...This paper reflects on the challenge that emotivism in moral philosophy sets for traditional cultures rooted in and shaped by natural wisdom. One could argue that Western and Chinese civilizations remain utterly incommensurable and incommunicable to each other unless they share in some common source.C. S. Lewis describes 'the sole source of all value judgments'by the notion of the'Tao'. The reflection points to Matteo Ricci’s appreciation of natural reason as providing the means for dialogue between distant cultures. To give a further account of the sapiential dimension of natural reason,this paper offers some insight into Thomas Aquinas ’ metaethical doctrine. His medieval teaching sheds light on the natural sources of moral wisdom,practical reasoning,and human goodness,and thus helps to secure their philosophical account from the 'stepping outside the Tao'of emotivism.展开更多
Warren Quinn’s Radioman example makes vivid one of the strongest objectivist critiques of subjectivism:that an agent’s desires lack the power to rationalize her actions.The force of Radioman,however,derives from mak...Warren Quinn’s Radioman example makes vivid one of the strongest objectivist critiques of subjectivism:that an agent’s desires lack the power to rationalize her actions.The force of Radioman,however,derives from making the subjectivist commit to defining desires as dispositional states of action.Without this commitment,a subjectivist can escape Quinn’s argument and even save Radioman’s agency.In this paper,I will first present Quinn’s Radioman example and explain why it renders subjectivism inconsistent,then,I will offer a new conception of desires that stays within subjectivist parameters while avoiding the pitfall that doomed Radioman.I will go on to explain the flaw in Quinn’s argument against the power of desires to rationalize action,and,finally,I will present a modified version of Radioman who is indeed a rational agent.展开更多
In his essay ＂Nietzsche＇s Metaethics： Against the Privilege Readings,＂ Brian Leiter critically examines Richard Schacht＇s naturalistic interpretation of Nietzsche. Leiter focuses on the metaethical question： ＂W...In his essay ＂Nietzsche＇s Metaethics： Against the Privilege Readings,＂ Brian Leiter critically examines Richard Schacht＇s naturalistic interpretation of Nietzsche. Leiter focuses on the metaethical question： ＂What status--metaphysical, epistemological^o the values used to undertake [Nietzsche＇s] revaluation [of value] （the ＇assessing values＇） enjoy？＂ （2000, 277）. Are these values true or better justified？ Leiter describes Schacht＇s position as a ＂privilege reading＂ that holds that the perspective from which Nietzsche revaluates values is privileged on the basis of＂normative facts＂ which are constituted by certain ＂natural facts＂ （2000, 279）. Leiter attempts to outline and even enhance the argument he sees Schacht making for this position, which Leiter calls a naturalistic realism. Leiter however finds that the arguments for ＂privilege readings＂ are insufficient. He concludes that the perspective from which Nietzsche revaluates values is not privileged at all. It is simply the idiosyncratic perspective from which Nietzsche revaluates values. In this paper I argue that a version of Schacht＇s privilege reading can be supported using two fundamental components of Leiter＇s interpretation of Nietzsche： his methodological and substantive naturalism. When we use scientific methods and view social systems like other natural systems, we find that in contemporary science a privilege is given to the maximum power principle. This concept was initially conceived by the chemist and mathematician Alfred Lotka and further developed by the ecologist Howard Odum and it has a fundamental similarity to the will to power. This principle provides an empirical foundation for the will to power and Schacht＇s privilege reading of Nietzsche＇s metaethics. It provides further evidence that human life is ultimately part of a vast natural process and the growth of all natural systems is made possible by an increase in power.展开更多
文摘This article examines the criticisms and debates about Cornell realism.While critics,like Shafer-Landau,Tropman,Oliveira and Perrine,reject the claim by Cornell realism that moral knowledge can be empirically investigated the same as natural science is,I argue that some of their arguments are not sufficient to refute Cornell realism.What is crucial in assessing Cornell realism is distinguishing normative ethics from empirical science.While ethics is normative in nature,that of empirical science is descriptive and predictive.I also show that the debate between Tropman and Long is at cross purposes in their discussion about the nature of moral knowledge.By clarifying different meanings of moral knowledge,I argue that while arguments by Cornell realism can be applied to moral psychology,the study of normative ethics through empirical investigation still faces the problem of an is-ought gap.Indeed,many of Cornell realist arguments are begging many questions.I have also examined recent debates on normativity objection by Parfit and Copp.I argue that Copp’s naturalism is very similar to Huemer’s intuitionism.Copp’s argument of non-analytical naturalism seems to support rather than refute moral intuitionism.
文摘This paper reflects on the challenge that emotivism in moral philosophy sets for traditional cultures rooted in and shaped by natural wisdom. One could argue that Western and Chinese civilizations remain utterly incommensurable and incommunicable to each other unless they share in some common source.C. S. Lewis describes 'the sole source of all value judgments'by the notion of the'Tao'. The reflection points to Matteo Ricci’s appreciation of natural reason as providing the means for dialogue between distant cultures. To give a further account of the sapiential dimension of natural reason,this paper offers some insight into Thomas Aquinas ’ metaethical doctrine. His medieval teaching sheds light on the natural sources of moral wisdom,practical reasoning,and human goodness,and thus helps to secure their philosophical account from the 'stepping outside the Tao'of emotivism.
文摘Warren Quinn’s Radioman example makes vivid one of the strongest objectivist critiques of subjectivism:that an agent’s desires lack the power to rationalize her actions.The force of Radioman,however,derives from making the subjectivist commit to defining desires as dispositional states of action.Without this commitment,a subjectivist can escape Quinn’s argument and even save Radioman’s agency.In this paper,I will first present Quinn’s Radioman example and explain why it renders subjectivism inconsistent,then,I will offer a new conception of desires that stays within subjectivist parameters while avoiding the pitfall that doomed Radioman.I will go on to explain the flaw in Quinn’s argument against the power of desires to rationalize action,and,finally,I will present a modified version of Radioman who is indeed a rational agent.
文摘In his essay ＂Nietzsche＇s Metaethics： Against the Privilege Readings,＂ Brian Leiter critically examines Richard Schacht＇s naturalistic interpretation of Nietzsche. Leiter focuses on the metaethical question： ＂What status--metaphysical, epistemological^o the values used to undertake [Nietzsche＇s] revaluation [of value] （the ＇assessing values＇） enjoy？＂ （2000, 277）. Are these values true or better justified？ Leiter describes Schacht＇s position as a ＂privilege reading＂ that holds that the perspective from which Nietzsche revaluates values is privileged on the basis of＂normative facts＂ which are constituted by certain ＂natural facts＂ （2000, 279）. Leiter attempts to outline and even enhance the argument he sees Schacht making for this position, which Leiter calls a naturalistic realism. Leiter however finds that the arguments for ＂privilege readings＂ are insufficient. He concludes that the perspective from which Nietzsche revaluates values is not privileged at all. It is simply the idiosyncratic perspective from which Nietzsche revaluates values. In this paper I argue that a version of Schacht＇s privilege reading can be supported using two fundamental components of Leiter＇s interpretation of Nietzsche： his methodological and substantive naturalism. When we use scientific methods and view social systems like other natural systems, we find that in contemporary science a privilege is given to the maximum power principle. This concept was initially conceived by the chemist and mathematician Alfred Lotka and further developed by the ecologist Howard Odum and it has a fundamental similarity to the will to power. This principle provides an empirical foundation for the will to power and Schacht＇s privilege reading of Nietzsche＇s metaethics. It provides further evidence that human life is ultimately part of a vast natural process and the growth of all natural systems is made possible by an increase in power.
