The main thesis intended in this paper consists in that scientific knowledge of the physical world entails a conceptualization of it in a certain mode which is relative to,and dependent on,the theory assumed or constr...The main thesis intended in this paper consists in that scientific knowledge of the physical world entails a conceptualization of it in a certain mode which is relative to,and dependent on,the theory assumed or constructed.Physical theories embody conceptual systems that at once make possible and limit our conceptualization of how the world is and our cognitive access to what happens in it.From a conceptual holism(Brown,2007),we try to maintain that since we think of the world and understand what occurs in it by systems of concepts,they acquire major relevance to a philosophical stance about scientific knowledge.In a holistic sense,delimited,at least,by the system of concepts of a given theory,concepts have both a theoretical laden to scientific experience,according to the thesis of Hanson(1958),and an ontological laden to the world,which consists in that the statements that one can assert about the physical world,the entities,and systems that one can describe as well as the claims that one holds about the processes undergone by the physical systems are dependent on and relative to such conceptual system of such theory.Thus,the framework displayed here contrasts with the epistemological realist thesis in the sense that we cannot claim how the world is really but rather how we conceptualize it relative to our theory.In addition,we expose an epistemic concept of valid statement,relative to a theory,which becomes consistent and even complementary to the framework provided.展开更多
This paper compares Frege's philosophy of mathematics with a naturalistic and nominalistic philosophy of mathematics developed in Ye (2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011), and it defends the latter against the former. The pa...This paper compares Frege's philosophy of mathematics with a naturalistic and nominalistic philosophy of mathematics developed in Ye (2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011), and it defends the latter against the former. The paper focuses on Frege's account of the applicability of mathematics in the sciences and his conceptual realism. It argues that the naturalistic and nominalistic approach fares better than the Fregean approach in terms of its logical accuracy and clarity in explaining the applicability of mathematics in the sciences, its ability to reveal the real issues in explaining human epistemic and semantic access to objects, its prospect for resolving internal difficulties and developing into a full-fledged theory with rich details, as well its consistency with other areas of our scientific knowledge. Trivial criticisms such as "Frege is against naturalism here and therefore he is wrong" will be avoided as the paper tries to evaluate the two approaches on a neutral ground by focusing on meta-theoretical features such as accuracy, richness of detail, prospects for resolving internal issues, and consistency with other knowledge. The arguments in this paper apply not merely to Frege's philosophy. They apply as well to all philosophies that accept a Fregean account of the applicability of mathematics or accept conceptual realism. Some of these philosophies profess to endorse naturalism.展开更多
Godel asserts that his philosophy falls under the category of conceptual realism. This paper gives a general picture of GOdel's conceptual realism's basic doctrines, and gives a way to understand conceptual realism ...Godel asserts that his philosophy falls under the category of conceptual realism. This paper gives a general picture of GOdel's conceptual realism's basic doctrines, and gives a way to understand conceptual realism in the background of Leibniz's and Kant's philosophies. Among philosophers of mathematics, there is a widespread view that Platonism encounters an epistemological difficulty because we do not have sensations of abstract objects. In his writings, Grdel asserts that we have mathematical intuitions of mathematical objects. Some philosophers do not think it is necessary to resort to intuition to defend Platonism, and other philosophers think that the arguments resorting to intuition are too naive to be convincing. I argue that the epistemic difficulty is not particular to Platonism; when faced with skepticism, physicalists also need to give an answer concerning the relationship between our experience and reality. Grdel and Kant both think that sensations or combinations of sensations are not ideas of physical objects, but that, to form ideas of physical objects, concepts must be added. However, unlike Kant, Grdel thinks that concepts are not subjective but independent of our minds. Based on my analysis of Grdel's conceptual realism, I give an answer to the question in the title and show that arguments resorting to intuition are far from naive, despite what some philosophers have claimed.展开更多
文摘The main thesis intended in this paper consists in that scientific knowledge of the physical world entails a conceptualization of it in a certain mode which is relative to,and dependent on,the theory assumed or constructed.Physical theories embody conceptual systems that at once make possible and limit our conceptualization of how the world is and our cognitive access to what happens in it.From a conceptual holism(Brown,2007),we try to maintain that since we think of the world and understand what occurs in it by systems of concepts,they acquire major relevance to a philosophical stance about scientific knowledge.In a holistic sense,delimited,at least,by the system of concepts of a given theory,concepts have both a theoretical laden to scientific experience,according to the thesis of Hanson(1958),and an ontological laden to the world,which consists in that the statements that one can assert about the physical world,the entities,and systems that one can describe as well as the claims that one holds about the processes undergone by the physical systems are dependent on and relative to such conceptual system of such theory.Thus,the framework displayed here contrasts with the epistemological realist thesis in the sense that we cannot claim how the world is really but rather how we conceptualize it relative to our theory.In addition,we expose an epistemic concept of valid statement,relative to a theory,which becomes consistent and even complementary to the framework provided.
文摘This paper compares Frege's philosophy of mathematics with a naturalistic and nominalistic philosophy of mathematics developed in Ye (2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2011), and it defends the latter against the former. The paper focuses on Frege's account of the applicability of mathematics in the sciences and his conceptual realism. It argues that the naturalistic and nominalistic approach fares better than the Fregean approach in terms of its logical accuracy and clarity in explaining the applicability of mathematics in the sciences, its ability to reveal the real issues in explaining human epistemic and semantic access to objects, its prospect for resolving internal difficulties and developing into a full-fledged theory with rich details, as well its consistency with other areas of our scientific knowledge. Trivial criticisms such as "Frege is against naturalism here and therefore he is wrong" will be avoided as the paper tries to evaluate the two approaches on a neutral ground by focusing on meta-theoretical features such as accuracy, richness of detail, prospects for resolving internal issues, and consistency with other knowledge. The arguments in this paper apply not merely to Frege's philosophy. They apply as well to all philosophies that accept a Fregean account of the applicability of mathematics or accept conceptual realism. Some of these philosophies profess to endorse naturalism.
文摘Godel asserts that his philosophy falls under the category of conceptual realism. This paper gives a general picture of GOdel's conceptual realism's basic doctrines, and gives a way to understand conceptual realism in the background of Leibniz's and Kant's philosophies. Among philosophers of mathematics, there is a widespread view that Platonism encounters an epistemological difficulty because we do not have sensations of abstract objects. In his writings, Grdel asserts that we have mathematical intuitions of mathematical objects. Some philosophers do not think it is necessary to resort to intuition to defend Platonism, and other philosophers think that the arguments resorting to intuition are too naive to be convincing. I argue that the epistemic difficulty is not particular to Platonism; when faced with skepticism, physicalists also need to give an answer concerning the relationship between our experience and reality. Grdel and Kant both think that sensations or combinations of sensations are not ideas of physical objects, but that, to form ideas of physical objects, concepts must be added. However, unlike Kant, Grdel thinks that concepts are not subjective but independent of our minds. Based on my analysis of Grdel's conceptual realism, I give an answer to the question in the title and show that arguments resorting to intuition are far from naive, despite what some philosophers have claimed.