After years of governance, the momentum of the spread of commercial bribery in China has yet to be effectively curbed. Commercial bribery has become a major form ofcorruption in China, but there are very jew studies o...After years of governance, the momentum of the spread of commercial bribery in China has yet to be effectively curbed. Commercial bribery has become a major form ofcorruption in China, but there are very jew studies on this topic. This paper discusses commercial briber）, in terms of economics on transactions between the supplier （the bribegiver） and the demander （the bribe-taker）, analyzing reasons for the spread of commercial briberyin China from an economic perspective. The authors find that China＇s commercial bribery governance focuses on punishing the public sector and bribe-takers while it lacks sufficient governance measures on the private sector to address bribe-givers. This form of governance is dramatically different from that utilized in countries with mature market economies as well as some international organizations, which have different measures fortackling commercial bribery. Does governance have a causal effect on the spread of commercial bribery in China？The authors use penalty severity to indicate the private sector ＇srole and use a commercial bribery game under perfect rationality and evolutionary game theory models under bounded rationality to reveal the conditions and mechanism of the origin and spread of commercial bribery. The authors also analyze the role of the private sector （the potential bribe-giver） and the role of the punishment mechanism in commercial bribery governance. Results show that the penalties for bribe-giving are less severe than penaltiesfor bribe-taking. There is an especially clear asymmetric relationship between economic penalties for the bribe-giverand economic benefits gained from bribing, and the authors propose that this disparity is the institutional cause of the spread of commercial bribery in China. Froma local equilibrium and static perspective, asymmetric punishment is important for breaking down the alliance between the bribe-giver and the bribe-taken But from the general equilibrium and dynamic perspective, asymmetric punishment raises th展开更多
Retrofitting existing buildings has emerged as a primary strategy for reducing energy use and carbon emissions, both nationally and in cities. Despite the increasing awareness of retrofitting opportunities and a growi...Retrofitting existing buildings has emerged as a primary strategy for reducing energy use and carbon emissions, both nationally and in cities. Despite the increasing awareness of retrofitting opportunities and a growing portfolio of successful case studies, little is known about the decision-making processes of building owners and asset managers with respect to energy efficiency investments. Specifically, the research presented here examines the effects of ownership type, tenant demand, and real estate market location on building energy retrofit decisions in the commercial office sector. This paper uses an original, detailed survey of asset managers of 763 office buildings in nineteen cities sampled from the CBRE, Inc. portfolio. Controlling for various building characteristics, the results demonstrate that ownership type and local market do, in fact, influence the retrofit decision.Overall, this analysis provides new evidence for the importance of understanding ownership type and the varying motivations of differing types of owners in building energy efficiency investment decisions. The findings of both the survey analysis and the predictive model demonstrate additional support for the targeting of energy efficiency incentives and outreach based on ownership entity, local market conditions, and specific physical building characteristics.展开更多
文摘After years of governance, the momentum of the spread of commercial bribery in China has yet to be effectively curbed. Commercial bribery has become a major form ofcorruption in China, but there are very jew studies on this topic. This paper discusses commercial briber）, in terms of economics on transactions between the supplier （the bribegiver） and the demander （the bribe-taker）, analyzing reasons for the spread of commercial briberyin China from an economic perspective. The authors find that China＇s commercial bribery governance focuses on punishing the public sector and bribe-takers while it lacks sufficient governance measures on the private sector to address bribe-givers. This form of governance is dramatically different from that utilized in countries with mature market economies as well as some international organizations, which have different measures fortackling commercial bribery. Does governance have a causal effect on the spread of commercial bribery in China？The authors use penalty severity to indicate the private sector ＇srole and use a commercial bribery game under perfect rationality and evolutionary game theory models under bounded rationality to reveal the conditions and mechanism of the origin and spread of commercial bribery. The authors also analyze the role of the private sector （the potential bribe-giver） and the role of the punishment mechanism in commercial bribery governance. Results show that the penalties for bribe-giving are less severe than penaltiesfor bribe-taking. There is an especially clear asymmetric relationship between economic penalties for the bribe-giverand economic benefits gained from bribing, and the authors propose that this disparity is the institutional cause of the spread of commercial bribery in China. Froma local equilibrium and static perspective, asymmetric punishment is important for breaking down the alliance between the bribe-giver and the bribe-taken But from the general equilibrium and dynamic perspective, asymmetric punishment raises th
基金Chinese Academy of Sciences Foundation(Science 100 and KSCX2-YW-N-039)National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.70225003/70024001)the World Bank,the Ford Foundation and the Canadian International Development Agency Supported
文摘Retrofitting existing buildings has emerged as a primary strategy for reducing energy use and carbon emissions, both nationally and in cities. Despite the increasing awareness of retrofitting opportunities and a growing portfolio of successful case studies, little is known about the decision-making processes of building owners and asset managers with respect to energy efficiency investments. Specifically, the research presented here examines the effects of ownership type, tenant demand, and real estate market location on building energy retrofit decisions in the commercial office sector. This paper uses an original, detailed survey of asset managers of 763 office buildings in nineteen cities sampled from the CBRE, Inc. portfolio. Controlling for various building characteristics, the results demonstrate that ownership type and local market do, in fact, influence the retrofit decision.Overall, this analysis provides new evidence for the importance of understanding ownership type and the varying motivations of differing types of owners in building energy efficiency investment decisions. The findings of both the survey analysis and the predictive model demonstrate additional support for the targeting of energy efficiency incentives and outreach based on ownership entity, local market conditions, and specific physical building characteristics.
