This paper examines the effects of board affiliation on the corporate pay gap.Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2011, we find that boards with a greater presence of directors appointed by block share...This paper examines the effects of board affiliation on the corporate pay gap.Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2011, we find that boards with a greater presence of directors appointed by block shareholders have lower pay gaps. Furthermore, the governance effects of board affiliation with and without pay are distinguished. The empirical results show that board affiliation without pay is negatively related to the pay gap, while board affiliation with pay is positively related to the pay gap. Overall, the results shed light on how block shareholders affect their companies' pay gaps through board affiliation.展开更多
We incorporate large losses risks into the DeM arzo et al.(2012) model of dynamic agency and the q theory of investment.The large losses risks induce losses costs and losses arising from agency conflicts during the la...We incorporate large losses risks into the DeM arzo et al.(2012) model of dynamic agency and the q theory of investment.The large losses risks induce losses costs and losses arising from agency conflicts during the large losses prevention process.Both of them reduce firm’s value,distort investment policy and generate a deeper wedge between the marginal and average q.In addition,we study the implementation of the contract to enhance the practical utility of our model.The agent optimally manages the firm’s cash flow and treats the cash reservation and credit line as the firm’s financial slack,and hedges the productivity shocks and large losses shocks via futures and insurance contracts,respectively.展开更多
基金supported by the National Nature Science Foundation of China (71263034, 71002111)the Humanities and Social Science Project of the Ministry of Education of China (10XJC630003)the Program of Higher-level Talents at Inner Mongolia University, China (Z20100103)
文摘This paper examines the effects of board affiliation on the corporate pay gap.Using a sample of Chinese listed firms from 2005 to 2011, we find that boards with a greater presence of directors appointed by block shareholders have lower pay gaps. Furthermore, the governance effects of board affiliation with and without pay are distinguished. The empirical results show that board affiliation without pay is negatively related to the pay gap, while board affiliation with pay is positively related to the pay gap. Overall, the results shed light on how block shareholders affect their companies' pay gaps through board affiliation.
基金Supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(11571310 and 71371168)
文摘We incorporate large losses risks into the DeM arzo et al.(2012) model of dynamic agency and the q theory of investment.The large losses risks induce losses costs and losses arising from agency conflicts during the large losses prevention process.Both of them reduce firm’s value,distort investment policy and generate a deeper wedge between the marginal and average q.In addition,we study the implementation of the contract to enhance the practical utility of our model.The agent optimally manages the firm’s cash flow and treats the cash reservation and credit line as the firm’s financial slack,and hedges the productivity shocks and large losses shocks via futures and insurance contracts,respectively.
