Masking is one of the most commonly used Side-Channel Attack （SCA） countermeasures and is built on a security framework, such as the ISW framework, and ensures theoretical security through secret sharing. Unfortunat...Masking is one of the most commonly used Side-Channel Attack （SCA） countermeasures and is built on a security framework, such as the ISW framework, and ensures theoretical security through secret sharing. Unfortunately, the theoretical security cannot guarantee practical security, because several possible weaknesses may exist in the actual implementation. These weaknesses likely come from the masking schemes or are introduced by the implementation methods. Finding the possible weakness of the masking scheme is an interesting and important issue for real applications. In this paper, the possible weaknesses for masking schemes in Field- Programmable Gate Array （FPGA） design are discussed. It was found that the combinational circuit is the key to the security of masking schemes. The Toggle Count （TC） method and its extension are utilized to evaluate the security of masking schemes in the design phase and the implementation phase separately. Comparing different logic-level simulators for the Xilinx FPGA platform, the behavioral and post-translate simulations are considered as the analysis method in the design phase, while the post-map and the post-route simulations are used to find the weakness during the implementation phase. Moreover, a Standard Delay Format （SDF） based improvement scheme is proposed to significantly increase the effectiveness of the TC model.展开更多
Side-channel attacks(SCAs)play an important role in the security evaluation of cryptographic devices.As a form of SCAs,profiled differential power analysis(DPA)is among the most powerful and efficient by taking advant...Side-channel attacks(SCAs)play an important role in the security evaluation of cryptographic devices.As a form of SCAs,profiled differential power analysis(DPA)is among the most powerful and efficient by taking advantage of a profiling phase that learns features from a controlled device.Linear regression(LR)based profiling,a special profiling method proposed by Schindler et al.,could be extended to generic-emulating DPA(differential power analysis)by on-the-fly profiling.The formal extension was proposed by Whitnall et al.named SLR-based method.Later,to improve SLR-based method,Wang et al.introduced a method based on ridge regression.However,the constant format of L-2 penalty still limits the performance of profiling.In this paper,we generalize the ridge-based method and propose a new strategy of using variable regularization.We then analyze from a theoretical point of view why we should not use constant penalty format for all cases.Roughly speaking,our work reveals the underlying mechanism of how different formats affect the profiling process in the context of side channel.Therefore,by selecting a proper regularization,we could push the limits of LR-based profiling.Finally,we conduct simulation-based and practical experiments to confirm our analysis.Specifically,the results of our practical experiments show that the proper formats of regularization are different among real devices.展开更多
微架构侧信道攻击(microarchitectural side channel attack)是一种利用处理器微架构状态开展侧信道攻击的方式.它打破了操作系统及其他软件层面提供的隔离手段,严重威胁了用户的信息安全,受到了学术界的广泛关注.与其他传统侧信道攻击...微架构侧信道攻击(microarchitectural side channel attack)是一种利用处理器微架构状态开展侧信道攻击的方式.它打破了操作系统及其他软件层面提供的隔离手段,严重威胁了用户的信息安全,受到了学术界的广泛关注.与其他传统侧信道攻击不同,微架构侧信道攻击不需要攻击者与被攻击对象存在物理接触,也不需要复杂的分析设备,它只需要能够与受害者在同一环境中执行代码就可以完成攻击.基于缓存的侧信道攻击(cache-based side channel attack)利用处理器中广泛存在的缓存(cache)结构,所以这种攻击方式最有吸引力,研究也最为深入.首先总结了微架构侧信道攻击尤其是缓存侧信道攻击相关的硬件架构,之后从攻击者能力、攻击步骤以及攻击目标对攻击模型进行讨论,并根据攻击模型对现有的防御措施进行分类和比较,重点介绍了新型安全缓存架构及其设计方案,最后讨论了现有防御措施面临的挑战以及未来的研究方向.展开更多
基金supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant (No. 61472292)the key technology research of new-generation high-speed and high-level security chip for smart grid (No. 526816160015)in part by the Technological Innovation of Hubei Province (Major Special Project, No. 2018AAA046)
文摘Masking is one of the most commonly used Side-Channel Attack （SCA） countermeasures and is built on a security framework, such as the ISW framework, and ensures theoretical security through secret sharing. Unfortunately, the theoretical security cannot guarantee practical security, because several possible weaknesses may exist in the actual implementation. These weaknesses likely come from the masking schemes or are introduced by the implementation methods. Finding the possible weakness of the masking scheme is an interesting and important issue for real applications. In this paper, the possible weaknesses for masking schemes in Field- Programmable Gate Array （FPGA） design are discussed. It was found that the combinational circuit is the key to the security of masking schemes. The Toggle Count （TC） method and its extension are utilized to evaluate the security of masking schemes in the design phase and the implementation phase separately. Comparing different logic-level simulators for the Xilinx FPGA platform, the behavioral and post-translate simulations are considered as the analysis method in the design phase, while the post-map and the post-route simulations are used to find the weakness during the implementation phase. Moreover, a Standard Delay Format （SDF） based improvement scheme is proposed to significantly increase the effectiveness of the TC model.
基金supported by the State Grid Science and Technology Project of China under Grant No.546816190003.
文摘Side-channel attacks(SCAs)play an important role in the security evaluation of cryptographic devices.As a form of SCAs,profiled differential power analysis(DPA)is among the most powerful and efficient by taking advantage of a profiling phase that learns features from a controlled device.Linear regression(LR)based profiling,a special profiling method proposed by Schindler et al.,could be extended to generic-emulating DPA(differential power analysis)by on-the-fly profiling.The formal extension was proposed by Whitnall et al.named SLR-based method.Later,to improve SLR-based method,Wang et al.introduced a method based on ridge regression.However,the constant format of L-2 penalty still limits the performance of profiling.In this paper,we generalize the ridge-based method and propose a new strategy of using variable regularization.We then analyze from a theoretical point of view why we should not use constant penalty format for all cases.Roughly speaking,our work reveals the underlying mechanism of how different formats affect the profiling process in the context of side channel.Therefore,by selecting a proper regularization,we could push the limits of LR-based profiling.Finally,we conduct simulation-based and practical experiments to confirm our analysis.Specifically,the results of our practical experiments show that the proper formats of regularization are different among real devices.
文摘微架构侧信道攻击(microarchitectural side channel attack)是一种利用处理器微架构状态开展侧信道攻击的方式.它打破了操作系统及其他软件层面提供的隔离手段,严重威胁了用户的信息安全,受到了学术界的广泛关注.与其他传统侧信道攻击不同,微架构侧信道攻击不需要攻击者与被攻击对象存在物理接触,也不需要复杂的分析设备,它只需要能够与受害者在同一环境中执行代码就可以完成攻击.基于缓存的侧信道攻击(cache-based side channel attack)利用处理器中广泛存在的缓存(cache)结构,所以这种攻击方式最有吸引力,研究也最为深入.首先总结了微架构侧信道攻击尤其是缓存侧信道攻击相关的硬件架构,之后从攻击者能力、攻击步骤以及攻击目标对攻击模型进行讨论,并根据攻击模型对现有的防御措施进行分类和比较,重点介绍了新型安全缓存架构及其设计方案,最后讨论了现有防御措施面临的挑战以及未来的研究方向.
