The standard Kripke semantics of epistemic logics has been applied successfully to reasoning communication protocols under the assumption that the network is not hostile. This paper introduces a natural semantics of K...The standard Kripke semantics of epistemic logics has been applied successfully to reasoning communication protocols under the assumption that the network is not hostile. This paper introduces a natural semantics of Kripke semantics called knowledge structure and, by this kind of Kripke semantics, analyzes communication protocols over hostile networks, especially on authentication protocols. Compared with BAN-like logics, the method is automatically implementable because it operates on the actual definitions of the protocols, not on some difficult-to-establish justifications of them. What is more, the corresponding tool called SPV (Security Protocol Verifier) has been developed. Another salient point of this approach is that it is justification-oriented instead of falsification-oriented, i.e. finding bugs in protocols.展开更多
In order to satisfy the safety-critical requirements,the train control system(TCS) often employs a layered safety communication protocol to provide reliable services.However,both description and verification of the sa...In order to satisfy the safety-critical requirements,the train control system(TCS) often employs a layered safety communication protocol to provide reliable services.However,both description and verification of the safety protocols may be formidable due to the system complexity.In this paper,interface automata(IA) are used to describe the safety service interface behaviors of safety communication protocol.A formal verification method is proposed to describe the safety communication protocols using IA and translate IA model into PROMELA model so that the protocols can be verified by the model checker SPIN.A case study of using this method to describe and verify a safety communication protocol is included.The verification results illustrate that the proposed method is effective to describe the safety protocols and verify deadlocks,livelocks and several mandatory consistency properties.A prototype of safety protocols is also developed based on the presented formally verifying method.展开更多
基金the reviewers.an d the trem endous kind help from the editors.This work was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Grant Nos.64096327,10410638 , 60473004)Germ an Research Foundation(Grant No.446 CHV1 13/240/0.1) Guangdong Provincial Natural Science Foundation(Grant No.04205407)
文摘The standard Kripke semantics of epistemic logics has been applied successfully to reasoning communication protocols under the assumption that the network is not hostile. This paper introduces a natural semantics of Kripke semantics called knowledge structure and, by this kind of Kripke semantics, analyzes communication protocols over hostile networks, especially on authentication protocols. Compared with BAN-like logics, the method is automatically implementable because it operates on the actual definitions of the protocols, not on some difficult-to-establish justifications of them. What is more, the corresponding tool called SPV (Security Protocol Verifier) has been developed. Another salient point of this approach is that it is justification-oriented instead of falsification-oriented, i.e. finding bugs in protocols.
基金supported by the New Century Excellent Researcher Award Program from Ministry of Education of China (Grant No. NCET-07-0059)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (Grant No.2011YJS006)+1 种基金the National High Technology Research and DevelopmentProgram of China ("863" Program) (Grant No. 2011AA010104)the State Key Laboratory of Rail Traffic Control and Safety Research Project(Grant Nos. RCS2008ZZ001, RCS2008ZZ005)
文摘In order to satisfy the safety-critical requirements,the train control system(TCS) often employs a layered safety communication protocol to provide reliable services.However,both description and verification of the safety protocols may be formidable due to the system complexity.In this paper,interface automata(IA) are used to describe the safety service interface behaviors of safety communication protocol.A formal verification method is proposed to describe the safety communication protocols using IA and translate IA model into PROMELA model so that the protocols can be verified by the model checker SPIN.A case study of using this method to describe and verify a safety communication protocol is included.The verification results illustrate that the proposed method is effective to describe the safety protocols and verify deadlocks,livelocks and several mandatory consistency properties.A prototype of safety protocols is also developed based on the presented formally verifying method.
