Based on a sample of share pledging by the controlling shareholders of A-share listed firms,we investigate whether pledge risk is matched between pledgees and pledgers in China’s share pledge market.The results show ...Based on a sample of share pledging by the controlling shareholders of A-share listed firms,we investigate whether pledge risk is matched between pledgees and pledgers in China’s share pledge market.The results show that,compared with broker pledgees,commercial bank pledgees accept pledged stocks with lower market risk and the corresponding listed firms are at lower risk,have higher levels of information transparency and are more likely to be stateowned enterprises(SOEs).We also find that commercial bank pledgees do not ease the risk requirement of pledged stocks for pledgers of SOEs.Further,we document that commercial bank pledgees face lower margin call risks than broker pledgees.After securities companies were authorized to compete in the share pledge market in 2013,the pledge risk faced by commercial bank pledgees further reduced.Our results support that China’s share pledge financing market generally achieves an efficient equilibrium in terms of pledge risk matching between pledgees and pledgers.We recommend that the macro control of share pledge risk be focused on broker pledgees.展开更多
通过对H型支架体系进行内力监测,研究混凝土浇筑期间支架水平杆件内力传递、分配规律,试验和数值分析表明:支架设有剪刀撑的断面水平杆可能受压,未设置断面水平杆可能受拉;上部水平杆内力略大于下部;梁、板下水平杆内力值变化趋势相同;...通过对H型支架体系进行内力监测,研究混凝土浇筑期间支架水平杆件内力传递、分配规律,试验和数值分析表明:支架设有剪刀撑的断面水平杆可能受压,未设置断面水平杆可能受拉;上部水平杆内力略大于下部;梁、板下水平杆内力值变化趋势相同;水平杆拉、压均不超过5 k N。展开更多
文摘Based on a sample of share pledging by the controlling shareholders of A-share listed firms,we investigate whether pledge risk is matched between pledgees and pledgers in China’s share pledge market.The results show that,compared with broker pledgees,commercial bank pledgees accept pledged stocks with lower market risk and the corresponding listed firms are at lower risk,have higher levels of information transparency and are more likely to be stateowned enterprises(SOEs).We also find that commercial bank pledgees do not ease the risk requirement of pledged stocks for pledgers of SOEs.Further,we document that commercial bank pledgees face lower margin call risks than broker pledgees.After securities companies were authorized to compete in the share pledge market in 2013,the pledge risk faced by commercial bank pledgees further reduced.Our results support that China’s share pledge financing market generally achieves an efficient equilibrium in terms of pledge risk matching between pledgees and pledgers.We recommend that the macro control of share pledge risk be focused on broker pledgees.
