We examine how concurrent enforcement changes affect the positive relationship between mandatory IFRS adoption and firms’ voluntary disclosure. We show that the increase in the issuance of management forecasts after ...We examine how concurrent enforcement changes affect the positive relationship between mandatory IFRS adoption and firms’ voluntary disclosure. We show that the increase in the issuance of management forecasts after IFRS adoption is smaller for firms from IFRS-mandating countries with concurrent enforcement changes than for those from countries without such changes. We find no difference in the increase of forecast informativeness between firms from IFRS-mandating countries without concurrent enforcement changes and firms from non-IFRS-mandating countries; however, firms domiciled in IFRS-mandating countries with concurrent enforcement changes exhibit a significantly smaller increase in forecast informativeness. Our findings suggest that better IFRS enforcement distinctly weakens (strengthens) the positive effect of IFRS adoption on voluntary (mandatory) disclosure.展开更多
本文以2006-2015年我国A股上市公司数据为研究样本,考察企业战略对管理层业绩预告行为的影响。根据Miles and Snow’s (1978, 2003)的分类标准,本文将公司分为三种类型:防御型、分析型和进攻型企业,在此基础上检验不同战略类型的企业管...本文以2006-2015年我国A股上市公司数据为研究样本,考察企业战略对管理层业绩预告行为的影响。根据Miles and Snow’s (1978, 2003)的分类标准,本文将公司分为三种类型:防御型、分析型和进攻型企业,在此基础上检验不同战略类型的企业管理层业绩预告行为,研究结果发现,相比于防御型企业,进攻型企业更可能自愿披露业绩预告,但是管理层业绩预告的精确性更低,即更倾向于发布定性估计和区间估计;并且业绩预告的预测误差更大、准确度更低,本文的研究结论在控制内生性问题后仍然稳健。本文的研究结论表明,企业战略对管理层业绩预告行为具有显著影响,本文为监管层和资本市场参与者加深了解管理层业绩预告行为提供了重要的经验证据,并且为进一步改善我国上市公司业绩预告制度提供一定的参考和借鉴。展开更多
Distinct from the literature on the effects that management earnings forecasts(MEFs) properties, such as point, range and qualitative estimations, have on analyst forecasts, this study explores the effects of selectiv...Distinct from the literature on the effects that management earnings forecasts(MEFs) properties, such as point, range and qualitative estimations, have on analyst forecasts, this study explores the effects of selective disclosure of MEFs.Under China's mandatory disclosure system, this study proposes that managers issue frequent forecasts to take advantage of opportune changes in predicted earnings. The argument herein is that this selective disclosure of MEFs increases information asymmetry and uncertainty, negatively influencing analyst earnings forecasts. Empirical evidence shows that firms that issue more frequent forecasts and make significant changes in MEFs are less likely to attract an analyst following, which can lead to less accurate analyst forecasts. The results imply that the selective disclosure of MEFs damages information transmission and market efficiency, which can enlighten regulators seeking to further enhance disclosure policies.展开更多
文摘We examine how concurrent enforcement changes affect the positive relationship between mandatory IFRS adoption and firms’ voluntary disclosure. We show that the increase in the issuance of management forecasts after IFRS adoption is smaller for firms from IFRS-mandating countries with concurrent enforcement changes than for those from countries without such changes. We find no difference in the increase of forecast informativeness between firms from IFRS-mandating countries without concurrent enforcement changes and firms from non-IFRS-mandating countries; however, firms domiciled in IFRS-mandating countries with concurrent enforcement changes exhibit a significantly smaller increase in forecast informativeness. Our findings suggest that better IFRS enforcement distinctly weakens (strengthens) the positive effect of IFRS adoption on voluntary (mandatory) disclosure.
文摘本文以2006-2015年我国A股上市公司数据为研究样本,考察企业战略对管理层业绩预告行为的影响。根据Miles and Snow’s (1978, 2003)的分类标准,本文将公司分为三种类型:防御型、分析型和进攻型企业,在此基础上检验不同战略类型的企业管理层业绩预告行为,研究结果发现,相比于防御型企业,进攻型企业更可能自愿披露业绩预告,但是管理层业绩预告的精确性更低,即更倾向于发布定性估计和区间估计;并且业绩预告的预测误差更大、准确度更低,本文的研究结论在控制内生性问题后仍然稳健。本文的研究结论表明,企业战略对管理层业绩预告行为具有显著影响,本文为监管层和资本市场参与者加深了解管理层业绩预告行为提供了重要的经验证据,并且为进一步改善我国上市公司业绩预告制度提供一定的参考和借鉴。
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Project 71102124)grants from the Beijing Municipal Commission of Education "Pilot Reform of Accounting Discipline Clustering"grants from the Beijing Municipal Commission of Education "Joint Construction Project"
文摘Distinct from the literature on the effects that management earnings forecasts(MEFs) properties, such as point, range and qualitative estimations, have on analyst forecasts, this study explores the effects of selective disclosure of MEFs.Under China's mandatory disclosure system, this study proposes that managers issue frequent forecasts to take advantage of opportune changes in predicted earnings. The argument herein is that this selective disclosure of MEFs increases information asymmetry and uncertainty, negatively influencing analyst earnings forecasts. Empirical evidence shows that firms that issue more frequent forecasts and make significant changes in MEFs are less likely to attract an analyst following, which can lead to less accurate analyst forecasts. The results imply that the selective disclosure of MEFs damages information transmission and market efficiency, which can enlighten regulators seeking to further enhance disclosure policies.
