Before the crisis of 1997-98,the East Asian economies-except for Japan but including China-pegged their currencies to the US dollar.To avoid further turmoil,the IMF now argues that these currencies should float more f...Before the crisis of 1997-98,the East Asian economies-except for Japan but including China-pegged their currencies to the US dollar.To avoid further turmoil,the IMF now argues that these currencies should float more freely. However,our econometric estimations how that the dollar’s Predominant weight in east Asian currency baskets has returned to its pre-crisis levels.By 2002,the day-to-day volatility of each country’s exchange rate against the dollar has again become negligible.In addition,most governments are rapidly accumulating a"war chest"of official dollar reserves,which portends that this exchange rate stabilization will come to extend over months or quarters.From the doctrine of"original sin"applied to emerging-market economies,we argue that this fear of floating is entirely rational from the perspective of each individual country.And their joint pegging to the dollar benefits the East Asian dollar bloc as a whole, although Japan remains an important outlier.展开更多
Instability in the worm dollar standard, as most recently manifested in the US Federal Reserve＇s near-zero interest rate policy, has caused consternation in emerging markets with naturally higher interest rates. Chin...Instability in the worm dollar standard, as most recently manifested in the US Federal Reserve＇s near-zero interest rate policy, has caused consternation in emerging markets with naturally higher interest rates. China has been provoked into speeding RMB ＂internationalization ＂; that is, opening up domestic financial markets to reduce its dependence on the US dollar for invoicing trade and making international payments. However, despite rapid percentage growth in offshore financial markets in RMB, the Chinese authorities are essentially trapped into maintaining exchange controls （reinforced by financial repression in domestic interest rates） to avoid an avalanche of foreign capital inflows that would threaten inflation and asset price bubbles by driving nominal interest rates on RMB assets down further. Because a floating （appreciating） exchange rate could attract even more hot money inflows, the People＇s Bank of China should focus on keeping the yuan/dollar rate stable so as to encourage naturally high wage increases to help balance China ＂s international competitiveness. However, further internationalization of the RMB, as with the proposed Shanghai pilot free trade zone, is best deferred until world interest rates rise to more normal levels.展开更多
Under the world dollar standard, a discrete appreciation by a dollar creditor country of the United States, such as China or Japan, has no predictable effect on its trade surplus. Currency appreciation by the creditor...Under the world dollar standard, a discrete appreciation by a dollar creditor country of the United States, such as China or Japan, has no predictable effect on its trade surplus. Currency appreciation by the creditor country will slow its economic growth and eventually cause deflation but cannot compensate for a saving-investment imbalance in the United States. Under a fixed exchange rate, however, differential adjustment in the rate of growth of money wages will more accurately reflect international differences in productivity growth. International competitiveness will be better balanced between high-growth and low-growth economies, as between Japan and the U.S. from 1950 to 1971 and China and the U.S. from 1994 to 2005, when the peripheral country＇s dollar exchange rate is fixed so that its wage growth better reflects its higher productivity growth. The qualified case for China moving toward greater flexibility in the form of a very narrow band for the yuan/dollar exchange rate, as a way of decentralizing foreign exchange transacting, is discussed.展开更多
Because the U.S. Federal Reserve＇s monetary policy is at the center of the world dollar standard, it has a first-order impact on global financial stability. However, except during international crises, the Fed focuse...Because the U.S. Federal Reserve＇s monetary policy is at the center of the world dollar standard, it has a first-order impact on global financial stability. However, except during international crises, the Fed focuses on domestic American economic indicators and generally ignores collateral damage from its monetary policies on the rest of the world. Currently, ultra-low interest rates on short-term dollar assets ignite waves of hot money into Emerging Markets （EM） with convertible currencies. When each EM central bank intervenes to prevent its individual currency from appreciating, collectively they lose monetary control, inflate, and cause an upsurge in primary commodity prices internationally. These bubbles burst when some accident at the center, such as a banking crisis, causes a return of the hot money to the United States （and to other industrial countries） as commercial banks stop lending to foreign exchange speculators. World prices of primary products then collapse. African countries with exchange controls and less convertible currencies are not so attractive to currency speculators. Thus, they are less vulnerable than EM to the ebb and flow of hot money. However, Afi-ican countries are more vulnerable to cycles in primary commodity prices because food is a greater proportion of their consumption, and--being less industrialized--they are of their commodity exports. Supply-side more vulnerable to fluctuations in prices shocks, such as a crop failure anywhere in the world, can affect the price of an individual commodity. But joint fluctuations in the prices of all primary products--minerals, energy, cereals, and so on--reflect monetary conditions in the world economy as determined by the ebb and flow of hot money from the United States, and increasingly from other industrial countries with near-zero interest rates.展开更多
文摘Before the crisis of 1997-98,the East Asian economies-except for Japan but including China-pegged their currencies to the US dollar.To avoid further turmoil,the IMF now argues that these currencies should float more freely. However,our econometric estimations how that the dollar’s Predominant weight in east Asian currency baskets has returned to its pre-crisis levels.By 2002,the day-to-day volatility of each country’s exchange rate against the dollar has again become negligible.In addition,most governments are rapidly accumulating a"war chest"of official dollar reserves,which portends that this exchange rate stabilization will come to extend over months or quarters.From the doctrine of"original sin"applied to emerging-market economies,we argue that this fear of floating is entirely rational from the perspective of each individual country.And their joint pegging to the dollar benefits the East Asian dollar bloc as a whole, although Japan remains an important outlier.
文摘Instability in the worm dollar standard, as most recently manifested in the US Federal Reserve＇s near-zero interest rate policy, has caused consternation in emerging markets with naturally higher interest rates. China has been provoked into speeding RMB ＂internationalization ＂; that is, opening up domestic financial markets to reduce its dependence on the US dollar for invoicing trade and making international payments. However, despite rapid percentage growth in offshore financial markets in RMB, the Chinese authorities are essentially trapped into maintaining exchange controls （reinforced by financial repression in domestic interest rates） to avoid an avalanche of foreign capital inflows that would threaten inflation and asset price bubbles by driving nominal interest rates on RMB assets down further. Because a floating （appreciating） exchange rate could attract even more hot money inflows, the People＇s Bank of China should focus on keeping the yuan/dollar rate stable so as to encourage naturally high wage increases to help balance China ＂s international competitiveness. However, further internationalization of the RMB, as with the proposed Shanghai pilot free trade zone, is best deferred until world interest rates rise to more normal levels.
文摘Under the world dollar standard, a discrete appreciation by a dollar creditor country of the United States, such as China or Japan, has no predictable effect on its trade surplus. Currency appreciation by the creditor country will slow its economic growth and eventually cause deflation but cannot compensate for a saving-investment imbalance in the United States. Under a fixed exchange rate, however, differential adjustment in the rate of growth of money wages will more accurately reflect international differences in productivity growth. International competitiveness will be better balanced between high-growth and low-growth economies, as between Japan and the U.S. from 1950 to 1971 and China and the U.S. from 1994 to 2005, when the peripheral country＇s dollar exchange rate is fixed so that its wage growth better reflects its higher productivity growth. The qualified case for China moving toward greater flexibility in the form of a very narrow band for the yuan/dollar exchange rate, as a way of decentralizing foreign exchange transacting, is discussed.
文摘Because the U.S. Federal Reserve＇s monetary policy is at the center of the world dollar standard, it has a first-order impact on global financial stability. However, except during international crises, the Fed focuses on domestic American economic indicators and generally ignores collateral damage from its monetary policies on the rest of the world. Currently, ultra-low interest rates on short-term dollar assets ignite waves of hot money into Emerging Markets （EM） with convertible currencies. When each EM central bank intervenes to prevent its individual currency from appreciating, collectively they lose monetary control, inflate, and cause an upsurge in primary commodity prices internationally. These bubbles burst when some accident at the center, such as a banking crisis, causes a return of the hot money to the United States （and to other industrial countries） as commercial banks stop lending to foreign exchange speculators. World prices of primary products then collapse. African countries with exchange controls and less convertible currencies are not so attractive to currency speculators. Thus, they are less vulnerable than EM to the ebb and flow of hot money. However, Afi-ican countries are more vulnerable to cycles in primary commodity prices because food is a greater proportion of their consumption, and--being less industrialized--they are of their commodity exports. Supply-side more vulnerable to fluctuations in prices shocks, such as a crop failure anywhere in the world, can affect the price of an individual commodity. But joint fluctuations in the prices of all primary products--minerals, energy, cereals, and so on--reflect monetary conditions in the world economy as determined by the ebb and flow of hot money from the United States, and increasingly from other industrial countries with near-zero interest rates.
