This paper concerns with the core of nonatomic games of form f(μ), where μ is a nonatomic nonnegative measure and f is a continuous convex function on the domain of μ. The main result of this paper is that the core...This paper concerns with the core of nonatomic games of form f(μ), where μ is a nonatomic nonnegative measure and f is a continuous convex function on the domain of μ. The main result of this paper is that the core of the game is not compact under the norm topology unless the game itself is a measure. This shows the largeness of the core in a sense other than that defined by Sharky for finite cases.展开更多
Fuzzy Shapley values are developed based on conventional Shapley value. This kind of fuzzy cooperative games admit the representation of rates of players＇ participation to each coalition. And they can be applicable t...Fuzzy Shapley values are developed based on conventional Shapley value. This kind of fuzzy cooperative games admit the representation of rates of players＇ participation to each coalition. And they can be applicable to both supperadditive and subadditvie cooperative games while other kinds of fuzzy cooperative games can only be superadditive. An explicit form of the Shapley function on fuzzy games with λ-fuzzy measure was also proposed.展开更多
文摘This paper concerns with the core of nonatomic games of form f(μ), where μ is a nonatomic nonnegative measure and f is a continuous convex function on the domain of μ. The main result of this paper is that the core of the game is not compact under the norm topology unless the game itself is a measure. This shows the largeness of the core in a sense other than that defined by Sharky for finite cases.
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China(70771010)the Second Phase of"985 Project"of China (107008200400024)the Graduate Student s Science and Technology Innovation Project of Beijing Institute of Technology (GB200818)
文摘Fuzzy Shapley values are developed based on conventional Shapley value. This kind of fuzzy cooperative games admit the representation of rates of players＇ participation to each coalition. And they can be applicable to both supperadditive and subadditvie cooperative games while other kinds of fuzzy cooperative games can only be superadditive. An explicit form of the Shapley function on fuzzy games with λ-fuzzy measure was also proposed.
