The Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness(CAESAR)supported by the National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST) is an ongoing project calling for submissions of authe...The Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness(CAESAR)supported by the National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST) is an ongoing project calling for submissions of authenticated encryption(AE) schemes. The competition itself aims at enhancing both the design of AE schemes and related analysis. The design goal is to pursue new AE schemes that are more secure than advanced encryption standard with Galois/counter mode(AES-GCM) and can simultaneously achieve three design aspects: security,applicability, and robustness. The competition has a total of three rounds and the last round is approaching the end in 2018. In this survey paper, we first introduce the requirements of the proposed design and the progress of candidate screening in the CAESAR competition. Second, the candidate AE schemes in the final round are classified according to their design structures and encryption modes. Third, comprehensive performance and security evaluations are conducted on these candidates. Finally, the research trends of design and analysis of AE for the future are discussed.展开更多
AEZ is an AES-based authenticated encryption submitted to the ongoing CAESAR competition and was presented at Eurocrypt2015 with AEZ v3. There are three models for AEZ, AEZ-core, AEZ-tiny and AEZ-prf. In this paper, w...AEZ is an AES-based authenticated encryption submitted to the ongoing CAESAR competition and was presented at Eurocrypt2015 with AEZ v3. There are three models for AEZ, AEZ-core, AEZ-tiny and AEZ-prf. In this paper, we consider the security of AEZprf for AEZ v4.2, the latest version of AEZ.Our major finding is a collision of any 256-bit associated data for AES-prf. Then we launch collision attacks in a quantum setting and a classical setting respectively under different assumptions. In the quantum setting, by Simon's quantum algorithm, we amount a forgery with O(n) quantum superposition queries and an overwhelming probability close to 1.In the classical setting, one with the key of AEZ-prf can also construct the forgeries. Our results show that the AEZ-prf models of AEZ v4.2 is not secure in both the quantum setting and classical world. Furthermore, our results can also be applied to AEZ v3, which has been published on Eurocrypt 2015. As far as we know, no cryptanalysis of AEZ v4.2 has been published so far.展开更多
基金Project supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China(Nos.61472357 and 61571063)the Open Fund of State Key Laboratory of Cryptology+1 种基金the Major Scientific Research Project of Zhejiang Labthe Alibaba-Zhejiang University Joint Institute of Frontier Technologies
文摘The Competition for Authenticated Encryption: Security, Applicability, and Robustness(CAESAR)supported by the National Institute of Standards and Technology(NIST) is an ongoing project calling for submissions of authenticated encryption(AE) schemes. The competition itself aims at enhancing both the design of AE schemes and related analysis. The design goal is to pursue new AE schemes that are more secure than advanced encryption standard with Galois/counter mode(AES-GCM) and can simultaneously achieve three design aspects: security,applicability, and robustness. The competition has a total of three rounds and the last round is approaching the end in 2018. In this survey paper, we first introduce the requirements of the proposed design and the progress of candidate screening in the CAESAR competition. Second, the candidate AE schemes in the final round are classified according to their design structures and encryption modes. Third, comprehensive performance and security evaluations are conducted on these candidates. Finally, the research trends of design and analysis of AE for the future are discussed.
基金supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Grant No.61572516, No.61272041 and No.61272488)
文摘AEZ is an AES-based authenticated encryption submitted to the ongoing CAESAR competition and was presented at Eurocrypt2015 with AEZ v3. There are three models for AEZ, AEZ-core, AEZ-tiny and AEZ-prf. In this paper, we consider the security of AEZprf for AEZ v4.2, the latest version of AEZ.Our major finding is a collision of any 256-bit associated data for AES-prf. Then we launch collision attacks in a quantum setting and a classical setting respectively under different assumptions. In the quantum setting, by Simon's quantum algorithm, we amount a forgery with O(n) quantum superposition queries and an overwhelming probability close to 1.In the classical setting, one with the key of AEZ-prf can also construct the forgeries. Our results show that the AEZ-prf models of AEZ v4.2 is not secure in both the quantum setting and classical world. Furthermore, our results can also be applied to AEZ v3, which has been published on Eurocrypt 2015. As far as we know, no cryptanalysis of AEZ v4.2 has been published so far.
