This research investigates the impacts of the manufacturer’s fairness concerns on the supply chain performance when the power retailer implements a price squeeze and market service investment together.Through game-th...This research investigates the impacts of the manufacturer’s fairness concerns on the supply chain performance when the power retailer implements a price squeeze and market service investment together.Through game-theoretic modeling,we find that 1)in the absence of fairness,although the manufacturer may be worse off due to possessing imperfect information on the price squeeze rate,the channel may be coordinated through an ex-ante negotiation between the two parties.2)When the manufacturer has fairness concerns for price squeeze,both channel performance and brand goodwill are made worse by disadvantageous inequality and improved by advantageous inequality versus the case of no fairness concerns.Furthermore,channel members’ex-ante negotiations regarding a profit reallocation scheme under certain conditions may achieve the following three objectives:generating a channel profit of the coordination level,promoting brand goodwill to the level of the integrated channel,and creating an equitable channel relationship.展开更多
Considering a one-supplier and two-retailer supply chain setting in which the supplier makes contacts with retailers in sequence based on FCFS(first–come–first-service) principle, the authors investigate the margina...Considering a one-supplier and two-retailer supply chain setting in which the supplier makes contacts with retailers in sequence based on FCFS(first–come–first-service) principle, the authors investigate the marginal effect of extra-gain guilty fairness concerns of supply chain members on the contract design, supply chain's profit and profit distribution. When the supplier considers distributional fairness of loss aversion and extra-gain guilty, extra-gain guilty concern reduces the optimal wholesale and retail price, and improves supply chain performance. When the first or the second retailer considers distributional fairness and peer-induced fairness, extra-gain guilty concerns decrease the optimal wholesale and retail price but increase the profit of all supply chain members only when the level of loss aversion is large enough and the level of extra-gain guilty is less than 1/2. However, when the level of loss aversion is small and the level of extra-gain guilty is less than 1/2, extra-gain guilty has no influence on supply chain performance. The analysis reveals that the supply chain performance can be further improved by considering fairness of extra-gain guilty.展开更多
Shear behavior of granular soil with fines is investigated using the discrete element method （DEM） and particle arrangements and inter-particle contacts during shear are examined. The DEM simulation reveals that fin...Shear behavior of granular soil with fines is investigated using the discrete element method （DEM） and particle arrangements and inter-particle contacts during shear are examined. The DEM simulation reveals that fine particles play a vital role in the overall response of granular soil to shearing. The occurrence of liquefaction and temporary reduction of strength is ascribed mainly to the loss of support from the fine particle contacts （S-S） and fine particle-to-large particle contacts （S-L） as a consequence of the removal of fine particles from the load-carrying skeleton. The dilative strain-hardening response following the strain-softening response is associated with the migration of fine particles back into the load-carrying skeleton, which is thought to enhance the stiffness of the soil skeleton. During shear, the unit normal vector of the large particle-to-large particle （L-L） contact has the strongest fabric anisotropy, and the S-S contact unit normal vector possesses the weakest anisotropy, suggesting that the large particles play a dominant role in carrying the shear load. It is also found that, during shear, fine particles are prone to rolling at contacts while the large particles are prone to sliding, mainly at the S-L and L-L contacts.展开更多
基金supported by National Natural Science Foundation of China:[grant number 72102194,72025201,72061127001]Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities[grant number kjcx20210105].
文摘This research investigates the impacts of the manufacturer’s fairness concerns on the supply chain performance when the power retailer implements a price squeeze and market service investment together.Through game-theoretic modeling,we find that 1)in the absence of fairness,although the manufacturer may be worse off due to possessing imperfect information on the price squeeze rate,the channel may be coordinated through an ex-ante negotiation between the two parties.2)When the manufacturer has fairness concerns for price squeeze,both channel performance and brand goodwill are made worse by disadvantageous inequality and improved by advantageous inequality versus the case of no fairness concerns.Furthermore,channel members’ex-ante negotiations regarding a profit reallocation scheme under certain conditions may achieve the following three objectives:generating a channel profit of the coordination level,promoting brand goodwill to the level of the integrated channel,and creating an equitable channel relationship.
基金partially supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China under Grant Nos.71571079,71301122,71671133,71131004Program for New Century Excellent Talents in University under Grant No.NCET-13-0228
文摘Considering a one-supplier and two-retailer supply chain setting in which the supplier makes contacts with retailers in sequence based on FCFS(first–come–first-service) principle, the authors investigate the marginal effect of extra-gain guilty fairness concerns of supply chain members on the contract design, supply chain's profit and profit distribution. When the supplier considers distributional fairness of loss aversion and extra-gain guilty, extra-gain guilty concern reduces the optimal wholesale and retail price, and improves supply chain performance. When the first or the second retailer considers distributional fairness and peer-induced fairness, extra-gain guilty concerns decrease the optimal wholesale and retail price but increase the profit of all supply chain members only when the level of loss aversion is large enough and the level of extra-gain guilty is less than 1/2. However, when the level of loss aversion is small and the level of extra-gain guilty is less than 1/2, extra-gain guilty has no influence on supply chain performance. The analysis reveals that the supply chain performance can be further improved by considering fairness of extra-gain guilty.
基金the University of Hong Kong for its financial support under the Seed Funding for Basic Research Scheme(20121159028)the National Natural Science Foundation of China(No.51209237)the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities(No.131gpy05)
文摘Shear behavior of granular soil with fines is investigated using the discrete element method （DEM） and particle arrangements and inter-particle contacts during shear are examined. The DEM simulation reveals that fine particles play a vital role in the overall response of granular soil to shearing. The occurrence of liquefaction and temporary reduction of strength is ascribed mainly to the loss of support from the fine particle contacts （S-S） and fine particle-to-large particle contacts （S-L） as a consequence of the removal of fine particles from the load-carrying skeleton. The dilative strain-hardening response following the strain-softening response is associated with the migration of fine particles back into the load-carrying skeleton, which is thought to enhance the stiffness of the soil skeleton. During shear, the unit normal vector of the large particle-to-large particle （L-L） contact has the strongest fabric anisotropy, and the S-S contact unit normal vector possesses the weakest anisotropy, suggesting that the large particles play a dominant role in carrying the shear load. It is also found that, during shear, fine particles are prone to rolling at contacts while the large particles are prone to sliding, mainly at the S-L and L-L contacts.
