This Article challenges the prevailing view of the efficacy of harmonized international financial regulation and provides a mechanism for facilitating regulatory diversity and experimentation within the existing globa...This Article challenges the prevailing view of the efficacy of harmonized international financial regulation and provides a mechanism for facilitating regulatory diversity and experimentation within the existing global regulatory framework,the Basel Accords.Recent experience suggests that regulatory harmonization can increase,rather than decrease,systemic risk,an effect that is the precise opposite of the objective of harmonization.By incentivizing financial institutions worldwide to follow broadly similar business strategies,regulatory error contributed to a global financial crisis.Furthermore,the dynamic nature of financial markets renders it improbable that regulators will be able to predict with confidence what are the optimal capital requirements or what other regulatory policies would reduce systemic risk.Nor,as past experience suggests,is it likely that regulators will be able to predict which future financial innovations,activities or institutions might generate systemic risk.The Article contends,accordingly,that there would be value added from increasing the flexibility of the international financial regulatory architecture as a means of reducing systemic risk.It proposes making the Basel architecture more adaptable by creating aprocedural mechanism to allow for departures along multiple dimensions from Basel while providing safe guards,given the limited knowledge that we do possess,against the ratcheting up of systemic risk from such departures.The core of the mechanism to introduce diversity into Basel is a peer review of proposed departures from Basel,and,upon approval of such departures,ongoing monitoring for their impact on global systemic risk.If a departure were found to increase systemic risk,it would be disallowed.Such a diversity mechanism would improve the quality of regulatory decision-making by generating information on which regulations work best under which circumstances.It would also reduce the threat to financial stability posed by regulatory errors that increase systemic risk by reducin展开更多
This Article challenges the prevailing view of the efficacy of harmonized international financial regulation and provides a mechanism for facilitating regulatory diversity and experimentation within the existing globa...This Article challenges the prevailing view of the efficacy of harmonized international financial regulation and provides a mechanism for facilitating regulatory diversity and experimentation within the existing global regulatory framework,the Basel Accords.Recent experience suggests that regulatory harmonization can increase,rather than decrease,systemic risk,an effect that is the precise opposite of the objective of harmonization.By incentivizing financial institutions worldwide to follow broadly similar business strategies,regulatory error contributed to a global financial crisis.Furthermore,the dynamic nature of financial markets renders it improbable that regulators will be able to predict with confidence what are the optimal capital requirements or what other regulatory policies would reduce systemic risk.Nor,as past experience suggests,is it likely that regulators will be able to predict which future financial innovations,activities or institutions might generate systemic risk.The Article contends,accordingly,that there would be value added from increasing the flexibility of the international financial regulatory architecture as a means of reducing systemic risk.It proposes making the Basel architecture more adaptable by creating aprocedural mechanism to allow for departures along multiple dimensions from Basel while providing safeguards,given the limited knowledge that we do possess,against the ratcheting up of systemic risk from such departures.The core of the mechanism to introduce diversity into Basel is a peer review of proposed departures from Basel,and,upon approval of such departures,ongoing monitoring for their impact on global systemic risk.If a departure were found to increase systemic risk,it would be disallowed.Such a diversity mechanism would improve the quality of regulatory decision-making by generating information on which regulations work best under which circumstances.It would also reduce the threat to financial stability posed by regulatory errors that increase systemic risk by reducing展开更多
Using the Soft Power 30 Index,this research focusses on assessing the soft power status of the United Arab Emirates(UAE)by exam-ining the elements of its soft power and potential challenges it may face in the future.T...Using the Soft Power 30 Index,this research focusses on assessing the soft power status of the United Arab Emirates(UAE)by exam-ining the elements of its soft power and potential challenges it may face in the future.This study conducts in-depth interviews with foreign diplomats and academics based in the UAE and Emirati diplomats and academics.These data are supplemented with primary and secondary data from governmental and inter-national agencies as well as media sources.The UAE’s case dem-onstrates that soft power can be consciously developed by any country regardless of its regime type,size,location,and religious or racial background by getting its domestic affairs in order.A country’s domestic success in governance,enterprise,culture,education and digital infrastructure leads to global attraction,which ultimately enhances the image of a country such as the UAE.It eventually creates opportunities for more global partner-ships and engagements in the areas of multilateralism,philan-thropy,peacebuilding,conflict resolution and event hosting.However,these efforts face the following challenges:the threat of widely diffused actions among public and private actors,the financial cost of soft power engagement and projections,the UAE’s lack of a global media platform for shaping global agendas and its increasing use of hard power in response to geopolitical threats which can negatively affect its image.展开更多
文摘This Article challenges the prevailing view of the efficacy of harmonized international financial regulation and provides a mechanism for facilitating regulatory diversity and experimentation within the existing global regulatory framework,the Basel Accords.Recent experience suggests that regulatory harmonization can increase,rather than decrease,systemic risk,an effect that is the precise opposite of the objective of harmonization.By incentivizing financial institutions worldwide to follow broadly similar business strategies,regulatory error contributed to a global financial crisis.Furthermore,the dynamic nature of financial markets renders it improbable that regulators will be able to predict with confidence what are the optimal capital requirements or what other regulatory policies would reduce systemic risk.Nor,as past experience suggests,is it likely that regulators will be able to predict which future financial innovations,activities or institutions might generate systemic risk.The Article contends,accordingly,that there would be value added from increasing the flexibility of the international financial regulatory architecture as a means of reducing systemic risk.It proposes making the Basel architecture more adaptable by creating aprocedural mechanism to allow for departures along multiple dimensions from Basel while providing safe guards,given the limited knowledge that we do possess,against the ratcheting up of systemic risk from such departures.The core of the mechanism to introduce diversity into Basel is a peer review of proposed departures from Basel,and,upon approval of such departures,ongoing monitoring for their impact on global systemic risk.If a departure were found to increase systemic risk,it would be disallowed.Such a diversity mechanism would improve the quality of regulatory decision-making by generating information on which regulations work best under which circumstances.It would also reduce the threat to financial stability posed by regulatory errors that increase systemic risk by reducin
文摘This Article challenges the prevailing view of the efficacy of harmonized international financial regulation and provides a mechanism for facilitating regulatory diversity and experimentation within the existing global regulatory framework,the Basel Accords.Recent experience suggests that regulatory harmonization can increase,rather than decrease,systemic risk,an effect that is the precise opposite of the objective of harmonization.By incentivizing financial institutions worldwide to follow broadly similar business strategies,regulatory error contributed to a global financial crisis.Furthermore,the dynamic nature of financial markets renders it improbable that regulators will be able to predict with confidence what are the optimal capital requirements or what other regulatory policies would reduce systemic risk.Nor,as past experience suggests,is it likely that regulators will be able to predict which future financial innovations,activities or institutions might generate systemic risk.The Article contends,accordingly,that there would be value added from increasing the flexibility of the international financial regulatory architecture as a means of reducing systemic risk.It proposes making the Basel architecture more adaptable by creating aprocedural mechanism to allow for departures along multiple dimensions from Basel while providing safeguards,given the limited knowledge that we do possess,against the ratcheting up of systemic risk from such departures.The core of the mechanism to introduce diversity into Basel is a peer review of proposed departures from Basel,and,upon approval of such departures,ongoing monitoring for their impact on global systemic risk.If a departure were found to increase systemic risk,it would be disallowed.Such a diversity mechanism would improve the quality of regulatory decision-making by generating information on which regulations work best under which circumstances.It would also reduce the threat to financial stability posed by regulatory errors that increase systemic risk by reducing
文摘Using the Soft Power 30 Index,this research focusses on assessing the soft power status of the United Arab Emirates(UAE)by exam-ining the elements of its soft power and potential challenges it may face in the future.This study conducts in-depth interviews with foreign diplomats and academics based in the UAE and Emirati diplomats and academics.These data are supplemented with primary and secondary data from governmental and inter-national agencies as well as media sources.The UAE’s case dem-onstrates that soft power can be consciously developed by any country regardless of its regime type,size,location,and religious or racial background by getting its domestic affairs in order.A country’s domestic success in governance,enterprise,culture,education and digital infrastructure leads to global attraction,which ultimately enhances the image of a country such as the UAE.It eventually creates opportunities for more global partner-ships and engagements in the areas of multilateralism,philan-thropy,peacebuilding,conflict resolution and event hosting.However,these efforts face the following challenges:the threat of widely diffused actions among public and private actors,the financial cost of soft power engagement and projections,the UAE’s lack of a global media platform for shaping global agendas and its increasing use of hard power in response to geopolitical threats which can negatively affect its image.
