Chinese sociologists have made two contributions to the property rights studies of contemporary Chinese society. One contribution is that they have revealed that the property rights contracts of rural collective asset...Chinese sociologists have made two contributions to the property rights studies of contemporary Chinese society. One contribution is that they have revealed that the property rights contracts of rural collective assets are based on principles of fairness—the principle of survival,the principle of equality to community members, the principle of taking land’s boundary as delimitation, and the principle that benefits belongs to investors. The other contribution is that they have discovered that the rules of property rights delimitation are diverse and uncertain in China, and the clients often rely on their own might to choose rules and to advocate their rights. The first contribution can help us understand the logic of social construction of "collective ownership", but lacks logical inference in the end. The other contribution is a challenge to a conclusion of the game theory of evolution—the local confirmity affect of institutional evolution, however, the challenge needs more empirical evidence to be rigorous.展开更多
文摘Chinese sociologists have made two contributions to the property rights studies of contemporary Chinese society. One contribution is that they have revealed that the property rights contracts of rural collective assets are based on principles of fairness—the principle of survival,the principle of equality to community members, the principle of taking land’s boundary as delimitation, and the principle that benefits belongs to investors. The other contribution is that they have discovered that the rules of property rights delimitation are diverse and uncertain in China, and the clients often rely on their own might to choose rules and to advocate their rights. The first contribution can help us understand the logic of social construction of "collective ownership", but lacks logical inference in the end. The other contribution is a challenge to a conclusion of the game theory of evolution—the local confirmity affect of institutional evolution, however, the challenge needs more empirical evidence to be rigorous.
