Voting procedure is an important mechanism for public choice in international organizations. This paper measures and compares [MF member countries' voting power before the 2008 reform and after the 2010 reform on the...Voting procedure is an important mechanism for public choice in international organizations. This paper measures and compares [MF member countries' voting power before the 2008 reform and after the 2010 reform on the basis of datasets on IMF quotas and voting rights distribution provided by IMF. Our study verifies that IMF's quotas and voting rights reforms do help to reduce the voting power gap among member countries. The 2008 and 2010 reforms produce a greater improvement in emerging members' voting power under the 70 percent majority rule than the 85 percent rule; the 70 percent majority rule means the United States would lose its absolute veto. Moreover, the paper disproves the underlying assumption that regards a member's voting power as proportional to its voting rights. Countries with different amounts of voting rights can still have the same voting power.展开更多
文摘Majority(MAJ)运算和反相(INV)运算组成完备集,数字逻辑电路可以用基于"MAJ/INV"的MI(Majority-Inverter)逻辑来实现。三输入MAJ门是MI逻辑电路的一种基本门电路单元。本文设计了一种基于碳纳米管场效应晶体管(Carbon Nanotube Field Effect Transistor,CNFET)的三输入MAJ门电路,并用所设计的MAJ门实现三个多输入组合逻辑电路。实验结果表明,在采用相同的器件和工艺的条件下,与现有的设计相比,所设计的MAJ门在功耗和功耗延时积上的改进最高分别达到32.5%和45.3%。
文摘Voting procedure is an important mechanism for public choice in international organizations. This paper measures and compares [MF member countries' voting power before the 2008 reform and after the 2010 reform on the basis of datasets on IMF quotas and voting rights distribution provided by IMF. Our study verifies that IMF's quotas and voting rights reforms do help to reduce the voting power gap among member countries. The 2008 and 2010 reforms produce a greater improvement in emerging members' voting power under the 70 percent majority rule than the 85 percent rule; the 70 percent majority rule means the United States would lose its absolute veto. Moreover, the paper disproves the underlying assumption that regards a member's voting power as proportional to its voting rights. Countries with different amounts of voting rights can still have the same voting power.