通过期权机制,建立供应链协调过程中各决策主体的决策模型,发现期权机制下的供应链及其成员的收益要优于报童模型(N ew svendor)的情况。供应商通过制定期权的价格政策和选择合适的产品出清方式,可以将部分市场风险转移给供应商,供应商...通过期权机制,建立供应链协调过程中各决策主体的决策模型,发现期权机制下的供应链及其成员的收益要优于报童模型(N ew svendor)的情况。供应商通过制定期权的价格政策和选择合适的产品出清方式,可以将部分市场风险转移给供应商,供应商也因此通过期权而获得相应的风险补偿,从而达到供应链协调,实现帕累托最优。根据电子半导体类产品的特征,对论文中的理论模型进行详细的模拟分析,结果验证了期权契约在供应链协调过程中的有效性。展开更多
This research examines how to use an option contract to coordinate a retailer-led supply chain where the market information can be updated. Based on Stackelberg game theory, we build a mode with one supplier and one ...This research examines how to use an option contract to coordinate a retailer-led supply chain where the market information can be updated. Based on Stackelberg game theory, we build a mode with one supplier and one retailer in which the retailer designs contracts to coordinate the supplier＇s production in a two-mode production environment. This focuses on an option contract that consists of two option prices and one exercise price. By theoretical analysis and numerical example, we find that such a contract can coordinate the supplier and retailer to act in the best interest of the channel. The optimal pricing conditions are given as follows： First, option prices should be negatively correlated to the exercise price and should be in a relevant range. Second, the first-period option price should be no greater than the second-period price and should be linearly correlated to the second-period option price when the latter is beyond some threshold. The results show that such option contracts can arbitrarily allocate the extra system profit between the two parties so that each party is in a win-win situation.展开更多
为实现物流服务供应链(Logistics Service Supply Chain,LSSC)整体利润的最大化,研究一个由物流服务集成商、物流服务提供商和功能型物流服务分包商组成的三级LSSC的协调问题.在考虑物流服务水平影响市场需求的情况下,建立以物流服务集...为实现物流服务供应链(Logistics Service Supply Chain,LSSC)整体利润的最大化,研究一个由物流服务集成商、物流服务提供商和功能型物流服务分包商组成的三级LSSC的协调问题.在考虑物流服务水平影响市场需求的情况下,建立以物流服务集成商为主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,提出一个由期权契约和成本共担收益共享契约组成的联合契约协调机制,即在LSSC的两个交易过程中,物流服务集成商与提供商之间采用期权契约协调,物流服务提供商与分包商之间执行成本共担收益共享契约.通过契约参数的合理选择实现LSSC最大收益和各成员共赢.通过均匀分布随机环境下的算例分析,验证契约机制的可行性和有效性.展开更多
文摘通过期权机制,建立供应链协调过程中各决策主体的决策模型,发现期权机制下的供应链及其成员的收益要优于报童模型(N ew svendor)的情况。供应商通过制定期权的价格政策和选择合适的产品出清方式,可以将部分市场风险转移给供应商,供应商也因此通过期权而获得相应的风险补偿,从而达到供应链协调,实现帕累托最优。根据电子半导体类产品的特征,对论文中的理论模型进行详细的模拟分析,结果验证了期权契约在供应链协调过程中的有效性。
基金the National Natural Science Foundation of China (Nos. 70532004 and 70621061)
文摘This research examines how to use an option contract to coordinate a retailer-led supply chain where the market information can be updated. Based on Stackelberg game theory, we build a mode with one supplier and one retailer in which the retailer designs contracts to coordinate the supplier＇s production in a two-mode production environment. This focuses on an option contract that consists of two option prices and one exercise price. By theoretical analysis and numerical example, we find that such a contract can coordinate the supplier and retailer to act in the best interest of the channel. The optimal pricing conditions are given as follows： First, option prices should be negatively correlated to the exercise price and should be in a relevant range. Second, the first-period option price should be no greater than the second-period price and should be linearly correlated to the second-period option price when the latter is beyond some threshold. The results show that such option contracts can arbitrarily allocate the extra system profit between the two parties so that each party is in a win-win situation.
文摘为实现物流服务供应链(Logistics Service Supply Chain,LSSC)整体利润的最大化,研究一个由物流服务集成商、物流服务提供商和功能型物流服务分包商组成的三级LSSC的协调问题.在考虑物流服务水平影响市场需求的情况下,建立以物流服务集成商为主导的Stackelberg博弈模型,提出一个由期权契约和成本共担收益共享契约组成的联合契约协调机制,即在LSSC的两个交易过程中,物流服务集成商与提供商之间采用期权契约协调,物流服务提供商与分包商之间执行成本共担收益共享契约.通过契约参数的合理选择实现LSSC最大收益和各成员共赢.通过均匀分布随机环境下的算例分析,验证契约机制的可行性和有效性.
