The nature of adhoc networks makes them vulnerable to security attacks. Many security technologies such as intrusion prevention and intrusion detection are passive in response to intrusions in that their countermea- s...The nature of adhoc networks makes them vulnerable to security attacks. Many security technologies such as intrusion prevention and intrusion detection are passive in response to intrusions in that their countermea- sures are only to protect the networks, and there is no automated network-wide counteraction against detected intrusions, the architecture of cooperation intrusion response based multi-agent is propose. The architecture is composed of mobile agents. Monitor agent resides on every node and monitors its neighbor nodes. Decision agent collects information from monitor nodes and detects an intrusion by security policies. When an intruder is found in the architecture, the block agents will get to the neighbor nodes of the intruder and form the mobile firewall to isolate the intruder. In the end, we evaluate it by simulation.展开更多
Mobile ad hoc networks are particularly vulnerable to denial of service （DOS） attacks launched through compromised nodes or intruders. In this paper, we present a new DOS attack and its defense in ad hoc networks. T...Mobile ad hoc networks are particularly vulnerable to denial of service （DOS） attacks launched through compromised nodes or intruders. In this paper, we present a new DOS attack and its defense in ad hoc networks. The new DOS attack, called AA hoc Flooding Attack（AHFA）, is that intruder broadcasts mass Route Request packets to exhaust the communication bandwidth and node resource so that the valid communication can not be kept. After analyzed AM hoc Flooding Attack, we develop Flooding Attack Prevention （FAP）, a genetic defense against the AM hoc Flooding Attack. When the intruder broadcasts exceeding packets of Route Request, the immediate neighbors of the intruder record the rate of Route Request. Once the threshold is exceeded, nodes deny any future request packets from the intruder. The results of our implementation show FAP can prevent the AM hoe Flooding attack efficiently.展开更多
基金This project was supported by the National Natural Science Foundation of China (60672068)the National High Technology Development 863 Program of China (2006AA01Z436, 2007AA01Z452.)
文摘The nature of adhoc networks makes them vulnerable to security attacks. Many security technologies such as intrusion prevention and intrusion detection are passive in response to intrusions in that their countermea- sures are only to protect the networks, and there is no automated network-wide counteraction against detected intrusions, the architecture of cooperation intrusion response based multi-agent is propose. The architecture is composed of mobile agents. Monitor agent resides on every node and monitors its neighbor nodes. Decision agent collects information from monitor nodes and detects an intrusion by security policies. When an intruder is found in the architecture, the block agents will get to the neighbor nodes of the intruder and form the mobile firewall to isolate the intruder. In the end, we evaluate it by simulation.
基金This project was supported by the National"863"High Technology Development Programof China (2003AA148010) Key Technologies R&D Programof China (2002DA103A03 -07)
文摘Mobile ad hoc networks are particularly vulnerable to denial of service （DOS） attacks launched through compromised nodes or intruders. In this paper, we present a new DOS attack and its defense in ad hoc networks. The new DOS attack, called AA hoc Flooding Attack（AHFA）, is that intruder broadcasts mass Route Request packets to exhaust the communication bandwidth and node resource so that the valid communication can not be kept. After analyzed AM hoc Flooding Attack, we develop Flooding Attack Prevention （FAP）, a genetic defense against the AM hoc Flooding Attack. When the intruder broadcasts exceeding packets of Route Request, the immediate neighbors of the intruder record the rate of Route Request. Once the threshold is exceeded, nodes deny any future request packets from the intruder. The results of our implementation show FAP can prevent the AM hoe Flooding attack efficiently.
